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The air transportation system in the United States is one of the most complex systems 
in the world. Projections of increasing air traffic demand in conjunction with limited 
capacity, that is volatile and affected by exogenous random events, represent a major 
problem in aviation system management. From a management perspective, it is 
essential to make efficient use of the available resources and to create mechanisms 
that will help alleviate the problems of the imbalance between demand and capacity. 
Air traffic delays are always present and the more air traffic increases the more the 
delays will increase with very unwanted economic impacts. It is of great interest to 
study them further in order to be able to more effectively mitigate them. A first step 
would be to try to predict them under various circumstances. A second step would be 
to develop various mechanisms that will help in reducing delays in different settings. 
  
The scope of this dissertation is to look closer at a threefold approach to the problem 
of congestion in aviation. The first effort is the prediction of delays and the 
development of a model that will make these predictions under a wide variety of 
distributional assumptions. The work presented here is specifically on a continuum 
approximation using diffusion methods that enables efficient solutions under a wide 
variety of distributional assumptions. The second part of the work effort presents the 
design of a parsimonious language of exchange, with accompanying allocation 
mechanisms that allow carriers and the FAA to work together quickly, in a 
Collaborative Decision Making environment, to allocate scarce capacity resources 
and mitigate delays. Finally, because airlines proactively use longer scheduled block 
times to deal with unexpected delays, the third portion of this dissertation presents the 
assessment of the monetary benefits due to improvements in predictability as 





















AVIATION CONGESTION MANAGEMENT 
IMPROVEMENTS IN MODELING THE PREDICTION, MITIGATION, AND 














Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the  
University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 













Professor David J. Lovell, Chair 
Professor Michael O. Ball 
Professor Paul Schonfeld 
Professor Cinzia Cirillo 

















































This has been a long journey and it wouldn't be feasible to reach the end without the 
help of many valuable people. Most of all, I would like to thank my advisor Pr. David 
Lovell for his guidance, help and support all these years. He is a very knowledgeable 
educator and a great mentor. I admire his ingenuity and his approach to problem 
solving, and he will always be a role model for me.  
I would also like to thank Pr. Michael Ball, it was an honor working with him and 
being guided by him. I would also like to thank the members of my committee, Pr. 
Paul Schonfeld, Pr. Cinzia Cirillo and Dr. Bob Hoffman, for their valuable feedback 
and direction. 
I would also like to thank my NEXTOR office mates with whom we shared ideas, fun 
times and I got to learn a lot from them: Andy, Alex, Moein, Nasim, Charles, Kennis, 
Carina, Xenia and James. 
Of course, this journey would not be the same without being surrounded by good 
friends, who made these past 7 years fun. I had the pleasure to meet and befriend so 
many people along the way. Friends, that we shared interests, concerns and 
experiences. I want to thank Kostas, Nikos, Giannis, Kostas, Laoura, Alex, Evripidis, 
Vasilis, Jason, Thodoris, Maya, Sasha, Udayan, Prem, Aram, David, Alice.  
I want also to thank some wonderful friends that I hold in a special place in my heart: 
Konstantinos, Anastasia, Myra, Rama, Pauline, Gianluca, Meggy. 
A special thanks goes to some friends that were my biggest support in the most 
difficult times and the best company for the wonderful times. My wonderful Giota 




needed someone to talk; and I am so lucky to know her. I love you. My beloved 
Georgia Vergadou who is one of the very few people I could open up to when I need 
it the most. I love you. Christos Vergados who knows me so well and would always 
understand me even if I said nothing. I love you. Yolanda Mahnke, my "sister" who is 
an amazing woman and cook (!) and it is a blessing to have her in my life. I love you. 
Konstantinos Zampogiannis who doesn't know how amazing he is, but I do, and I am 
so fortunate to call him my friend. I love you. 
I want also to thank my family. My parents Georgios and Christina Vlachou, who 
always supported, inspired and believed in me. I love you. My brother Nikos and 
sister-in-law Giouli and of course my niece Elisavet and nephew Aggelos. I love them 
dearly. They have given me so much strength to keep trying and never give up. 
Last but not least, I want to thank Haytham, who gave me the courage to finish this 
journey well. He is my biggest supporter. He was there in the craziest final moments, 
to cheer me up and make me believe that I have the strength to reach my goal. Enta 




Table of Contents 
 
 
Dedication ..................................................................................................................... ii	  
Acknowledgements...................................................................................................... iii	  
Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................. 1	  
1.1 Problem Description ........................................................................................... 1	  
1.2 Air Traffic Management ..................................................................................... 6	  
1.2.1 Air Traffic Flow Management Initiatives .................................................... 9	  
1.3 Scope of Work .................................................................................................. 19	  
1.3.1 Prediction of Delays................................................................................... 20	  
1.3.2 Delay Mitigation ........................................................................................ 22	  
1.3.3 Improved Predictability Will Ultimately Lead to Reduced Delays ........... 23	  
1.4 Organization of the Document.......................................................................... 26	  
Chapter 2: Delay Prediction........................................................................................ 27	  
2.1 Model Development.......................................................................................... 29	  
2.1.1 Governing Differential Equations.............................................................. 29	  
2.1.2 Boundary Conditions ................................................................................. 34	  
2.1.3 Initial Conditions ....................................................................................... 36	  
2.2 Numeric Solution Scheme ................................................................................ 38	  
2.3 Model Validation and Results........................................................................... 42	  
2.4 Conclusions....................................................................................................... 48	  
Chapter 3: Incorporating Airlines’ Preferences in Resource Allocation Mechanisms 
During Irregular Operations........................................................................................ 50	  
3.1 Motivation for this Research............................................................................. 50	  
3.2 Feedback from Airline Experts......................................................................... 51	  
3.3 Expressing Airlines Priorities ........................................................................... 52	  
3.4 Allocation Mechanism...................................................................................... 56	  
3.5 Trade-Off Between Slot Quantity and Minimizing Delay................................ 60	  
3.6 Results............................................................................................................... 62	  
3.7 Estimating the Long Run Effect of Preference Based Proportional Random 
Allocation................................................................................................................ 68	  
3.7.1 Monte Carlo Simulation for Deterministic Set of Flights.......................... 71	  
3.7.2 Monte Carlo Simulation for Random Set of Flights.................................. 78	  
3.8 Conclusions....................................................................................................... 87	  
Chapter 4: Impact of Improved Predictability ............................................................ 90	  
4.1 Analyzing Scheduled Block Times................................................................... 90	  
4.1.1 Scheduled Block Time for a Single Flight................................................. 92	  
4.1.2 Scheduled Block Time for Multiple Flights in a Day................................ 93	  
4.1.3 Estimating Distributions ............................................................................ 96	  
4.1.4 Fitting Gamma Distribution to Data ........................................................ 101	  
4.2 Estimating Scheduled Block Times ................................................................ 104	  
4.2.1 Source of Information .............................................................................. 104	  
4.2.2 General Process........................................................................................ 104	  
4.2.3 Airlines’ Differentiations ......................................................................... 106	  




4.3.1 Estimating the Benefits for the NAS ....................................................... 115	  
Chapter 5: Conclusion............................................................................................... 121	  







Chapter 1: Introduction 
The air transportation system in the United States is one of the most complex systems 
in the world. Every day approximately 60,000 flights of commercial, military and 
general aviation aircraft occupy the National Airspace System (NAS). Air traffic 
volume has proven to be quite volatile and susceptible to outside political and 
economic pressures, including most recently the terrorist attacks of September 11th 
and the recent economic recession. These events of course caused air traffic to 
decrease, and continue to hamper its recovery. Despite the economic downturn, the 
long range forecast remains positive. Even in a pessimistic scenario, the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) has predicted that the average passenger enplanement 
growth for the following 10 years will be about 1.5 percent per year (FAA, 2013a). In 
Figure 1.1 we can see the 2013 forecast for the system enplanements for the years 
2013-2022 under different scenarios. In the optimistic scenario, the growth rate of the 
passenger traffic could reach 3.4 percent annually. 
Another forecast for the next 20 years, which we can see in Figure 1.2, shows that the 
passenger enplanements could increase beyond 1 billion passenger enplanements in 
the next 20 years. This would be a result of an average annual increase of 2.2 percent. 
1.1 Problem Description 
Projections of increasing demand only represent one side of the problem in aviation 
system management, however. The capacities of various system resources can also be 
volatile and affected by exogenous random events, such as fluctuating weather 




make efficient use of the available resources and to create mechanisms that will help 
alleviate the problems of the imbalance between demand and capacity. Even with 
good forecasts of demand growth and capacity evolution, it is still complicated to 
model the specific consequences to be expected at individual airports. Day-to-day 
airline and airport operations are also quite complex, with their own uncertainties, 
plus un-knowable factors such as the proprietary actions of air carriers. 
 
Figure 1.1 2013 FAA Forecast for the system enplanements for the years 2013-2022 
(Source: 2013 FAA forecast) 
 
The performance of the NAS is too complicated to be represented directly by its 
“inputs” demand and capacity. Together, these things conspire to produce other 




increases, system delays tend to do the same. Similarly, delays increase with 
decreases in resource capacity, either systemic or impromptu, such as under the 
influence of adverse weather.  
Figure 1.3 shows the actual flight operations throughout the NAS for the years 2004-
2013. On the left portion of the figure, we can see evidence of the continued slow 
recovery of NAS traffic after September 11, 2001. The economic downturn that 
began in 2007-2008 is also reflected in a commensurate decrease in air traffic. There 
is some hint, on the right portion of the figure, that traffic is beginning to rise again.  
 
 
Figure 1.2 2013 FAA forecast for the system enplanements till the year 2033 






Figure 1.3 Flight operations for 2004-2013 
 
For the same years if we look at the percentage of flights that were delayed, in Figure 
1.4, we will see how these correlate to the traffic. Arrivals were delayed heavily in 
2007, when traffic had reached a seasonal high. A commensurate pattern of slightly 
lower magnitude can be seen for the departures. When the system was at its worst, 
about 24 percent of arrivals and 21 percent of departures were delayed more than 15 
minutes. The delays in 2007 were estimated to have cost the U.S. economy as much 
as $41 billion according to a report by the Joint Economy Committee (2008). More 
specifically, it was estimated that the traffic delays caused an increase of $19 billion 
of airlines’ operating costs, a $12 billion cost of passengers’ time and about $10 





Figure 1.4 Percentage of arrivals and departures that were delayed in the years 2004 – 
2013 
Looking at Figure 1.4 we can see that once the economy started impacting air traffic, 
the delayed flights dropped to about 15 – 18 percent. For 2013, where air traffic 
showed some significant increase, the delayed flights also increased in turn, to reach 
about 20 percent. 
It is evident that air traffic delays are always present and the more air traffic increases 
the more the delays will increase with very unwanted economic impacts. It is of great 
interest to study them further in order to be able to more effectively mitigate them. A 
first step would be to try to predict them under various circumstances. A second step 





Once the system is better handling unpredictable situations and delays are reduced, so 
will the need of airlines to pad their schedules against unforeseen circumstances. It is 
very well known that airlines, due to their need to adhere to their schedules, tend to 
add extra minutes to their scheduled flight times. Of course this allows them to be 
more resilient in cases where some flights suffer delays. In so doing, carriers can keep 
up with their schedules, have less missed connections and better on-time 
performance. At the same time this causes them to incur costs because of the extra 
time that planes and crews go unused. This is another aspect of traffic delays that is 
very interesting to look at further. 
1.2 Air Traffic Management 
In quite broad terms, the intended scope of this dissertation is to make inroads into 
three areas discussed so far: prediction of NAS system delays, system designs to 
allow carriers and the FAA to work together to reduce congestion and delays, and 
estimation of expected benefits from improving system efficiency. Before defining 
this scope of work in greater detail, a brief presentation of Air Traffic Management as 
it is contemporarily understood will follow in order to get a better understanding of 
the system, its components and actions. 
Air Traffic Management (ATM) is essential for the safe and efficient operation of 
airports and the airspace system. Advanced ATM systems as defined by deNeufville 
and Odoni (2003) must: 
• Accommodate an increasing number of users 




• Have a large number of skilled human operators to work seamlessly with a 
network of computers and communications, surveillance, and navigation 
equipment 
• Take advantage of technological developments 
• Keep the cost of all of this at a reasonable level 
ATM is considered to consist of two major components: Air Traffic Control (ATC) 
and Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM), as can be seen in Figure 1.5 below 
(Vossen, 2002). ATC refers to the processes that provide tactical separation services. 
The system users must maintain enough horizontal and vertical separation to avoid 
the risk of collision but at the same time capacity must be efficiently used (Ashford 
and Wright 1992). 
 
Figure 1.5 Air Traffic Management components 





Air Traffic Flow Management aims to detect and resolve demand-capacity 
imbalances by adjusting the flow of aircraft so that demand matches as well as 
possible the available capacity.  
The principal functions of ATFM, according to deNeufville and Odoni (2003), are: 
• To predict the locations of potential overloads 
• To develop strategies that will relieve these overloads 
• To oversee the implementation of these strategies 
Odoni (1987) has classified the ATFM initiatives that can resolve air traffic 
congestion in the following categories: 
• Long-term approaches that are focused on increasing capacity. That is 
achievable by constructing new airports or adding more runways to existing 
facilities. This approach is characterized by very high costs and raises many 
environmental concerns. Thus it is more difficult to implement. 
• Medium-term approaches that are more administrative and economic in nature 
and try to mitigate congestion by modifying temporal or spatial traffic 
patterns. For example at some airports, where the demand for airport 
infrastructure significantly exceeds the airport’s capacity, slots are allocated to 
the airlines by a coordinator, according to International Air Transport 
Association (IATA) guidelines (IATA 2012). Other approaches considered 
are congestion pricing and slot auctions. 
• Short-term approaches that consist mainly of adjusting the air traffic flows to 




congestion caused by unpredictable disruptions such as bad weather and are 
performed a few hours in advance.  
The research proposed for this dissertation is mostly motivated by some short-term 
initiatives.  
1.2.1 Air Traffic Flow Management Initiatives  
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is responsible for the coordination of air 
traffic and for ensuring the proper separation requirements in the controlled airspace. 
In order to carry out these functions, the FAA has divided the airspace over the 
Continental United States into 20 areas, as shown in Figure 1.6 (FAA 2009). Each of 
these areas is controlled by the corresponding Air Route Traffic Control Center 
(ARTCC). Each en route center is then divided into smaller areas, called sectors, 






Figure 1.6 En-Route Traffic Control Centers, United States. 
(Source: Federal Aviation Administration) 
Traffic controllers guide the aircraft from one sector to another until they arrive 
approximately 50-150 nautical miles from the destination airport. Then the aircraft 
are handled by the Terminal Radar Approach Control facility (TRACON). Finally, 
for the last 5 nautical miles to the destination airport, the handling of traffic is 
performed by the airport traffic control towers. A detailed flow chart of a flight 
trajectory decomposed by phase of flight is depicted in Figure 1.7 below (FAA 2009). 
Air traffic controllers in the above centers are responsible for the movement of 
aircraft within their area of responsibility and their decisions are based on real-time 
information about the flights entering their sectors. The strategic ATFM functions 
performed by the FAA are coordinated by the Air Traffic Control System Command 




monitors the current and forecast traffic demand throughout the National Airspace 
System (NAS) and identifies potential problems (like bad weather) that may constrain 
capacity. Whenever demand is predicted to exceed capacity the ATCSCC generates 
and implements strategies to mitigate the problem.  
 
Figure 1.7 Air Traffic Flow Chart 
(Source: Federal Aviation Administration) 
At this point it is important to mention that there is a need for partial decentralization 
of decision making. The FAA does not necessarily have all the information needed to 
make decisions on behalf of the users. To this end, Collaborative Decision Making 
(CDM) is an effort to improve Air Traffic Management. It is essential for all 
stakeholders involved (FAA, airlines) to share information so that all will be aware of 




collaborating. As described by deNeufville and Odoni (2003) the specific goals of 
CDM are: 
• To provide the FAA and the airlines with a common picture of the current and 
forecast air traffic conditions 
• To allow the person or organization in the best position to make each decision 
• To make the decisions in open manner so all will know what is happening and 
can contribute as necessary 
The ATFM initiatives that the FAA can implement under a CDM framework may be 
outlined as follows. 
Ground Delay Programs 
The Ground Delay Program (GDP) is a mechanism implemented when it is projected 
that the arrival demand at an airport would exceed capacity, usually because of 
adverse weather conditions around the airport area (Ball and Lulli 2004), although 
occasionally as a result of over-scheduling. The goal of a GDP is to decrease the 
arrival rate and this is achieved by intentionally delaying the take-off times for most 
flights intending to land at that airport (deNeufville and Odoni 2003). The motivation 
for doing so is that it is safer and cheaper for flights to absorb delays on the ground 
before take-off rather than while airborne. 
Metering 
Metering is used to control the rate that aircraft cross some specified spatial 
boundaries by adjusting the spacing between aircraft (deNeufville and Odoni 2003). 




controls the minimum time headways with which aircraft are allowed to pass a 
specific geographical point. The second category is distance-based, which specifies a 
minimum separation (in miles) between aircraft moving at the same direction. This is 
also known as “Miles-In-Trail” (Vossen 2002). 
Rerouting 
When an airspace area is impacted by adverse weather conditions and its capacity is 
reduced, rerouting might occur. With rerouting some flight routes are changed or 
restructured to modify the distribution of traffic flows (deNeufville and Odoni 2003). 
Rerouting sometimes is part of Severe Weather Avoidance Programs (SWAPs), 
which are implemented when traffic flows are affected by widespread severe weather 
in the system (Vossen 2002). 
Airspace Flow Program 
Airspace Flow Program (AFP) is a relatively new traffic flow initiative that was first 
introduced in the summer of 2006 and it marked a new step in Air Traffic 
Management (FAA 2009). When there is a capacity reduction in an area of the 
airspace (not a specific airport) due to adverse weather conditions, and rerouting by 
itself is not enough to deal with the problem, the AFP is intended to solve the 
problem. The first step is to identify the problematic area by creating an FCA. A Flow 
Constrained Area (FCA) is an area of the airspace that the FAA has identified as 
potentially congested (Hoffman et al., 2004). NAS users are informed when FCAs are 
issued along with reroute advisories in order to reduce the number of planes passing 




(FEA) precedes an FCA. The Traffic Situation Display (TSD) and the Common 
Constraint Situation Display (CCSD) provide traffic managers and flight dispatchers 
with the ability to define and display FEAs and/or FCAs (Vakili 2009). In the second 
step the Enhanced Traffic Management System (ETMS) takes the FCA description 
and produces a list of the affected flights and the times at which they are expected to 
pass through the FCA (Vakili 2009). This list is sent to the Flight Schedule Monitor 
(FSM) where flight operators, traffic controllers and service providers have access to 
the information and have a “common picture” of the situation. The traffic manager 
enters the expected capacity – expressed as the number of flights that can pass 
through the FCA per hour - in the FSM, which will then compute the best departure 
time for each flight scheduled to pass through the FCA, in order to lower the demand 
to meet the new capacity. During an AFP, resources are rationed by procedures such 
as Ration By Schedule (RBS), which is based on the principle of first-scheduled-first-
served.  
The FSM sends the controlled departure times to the flight operators and control 
towers. After they get the new flight-slot list, airlines have various options. They can 
have some of their flights depart according to the controlled times, they can reroute 
other flights around the FCA, and they can cancel some others. They can also swap 
departure times among their set of flights or they can even exchange slots with other 
operators, in a controlled transaction structure. All of these mechanisms are part of 
Collaborative Decision Making. Importantly, it is evident that airlines have at least 





Collaborative Trajectory Options Program 
One of the practical problems with the AFP, as described above, is that all of the 
mechanisms that carriers can employ to inject some of their individual preferences 
into the dispositions of their flights come after the initial capacity allocation done by 
the FAA. These machinations take time and are complicated to communicate quickly 
between the FAA and the carriers. Further, there is a sense that, if the carriers are to 
make significant revisions to each initial AFP allocation, then there is a waste of 
efficiency in the process to begin with. It might make more sense to try to capture at 
least some sense of their intentions before the initial allocation is conducted, thereby 
minimizing the effort involved in revising and coordinating with the FAA. 
This is the primary driver behind the Collaborative Trajectory Options Program 
(CTOP), which is part of the Collaborative Airspace Constraint Resolution (CACR) 
concept. With this program, airlines can express which flights they want to be 
assigned to which slot in the AFP capacity allocation process. 
There are three main points that distinguish CTOP from the current practices (FAA, 
2011a). 
• The communication between the FAA and the flight operators will be all 
electronic, which will make it faster and more precise than having voice calls 
or text advisories. 
• The flight operators can express their preferences in great detail and FAA 




• The decisions for the routes and assigned delays are made by automation and 
not humans, which allows a finely tuned solution to the congestion problem. 
Here follows an example of message exchange in CTOP for a better understanding of 
it (FAA 2011a). First, the flight operators send Trajectory Options Sets (TOS’s) to the 
Traffic Flow Management System (TFMS). A TOS is a set of trajectories for a given 
flight that are acceptable to the flight operator. Trajectories consist of route text, 
altitude, speed and departure time that specify the intended path of a flight through 
the NAS. An example of TOS for a flight from LAX to IAD is depicted in Figure 1.8 
(Flow Evaluation Team, 2014). The flight operator specifies the relative cost of each 
trajectory options as the extra amount of delay compared with the best trajectory (this 
has a delay equal to zero). 
 
Figure 1.8  Example of TOS for a flight from LAX to IAD 




When the FAA defines one or more FCA’s, the TFMS under CTOP sends a Traffic 
Management Initiative (TMI) with the airspace constraints to the flight operators, 
who reply with TOS’s appropriate for the subject flights. Through TFMS the traffic 
manager determines the best solution from a system perspective, taking both overall 
FAA objectives and carrier-declared delays into account. The solution consists of 
assigned routes, arrival slots and departure times for the constrained flights. If a flight 
does not have multiple trajectory options, it will be controlled by the current route. 
Thus, clearly carriers are not bound to participate or to declare TOS’s for all of their 
flights; there is a default posture for each flight when entering the optimization 
process. 
This process is not static – flight operators monitoring their flights are allowed to 
send new TOS’s (clearly only for those flights whose dispositions are not yet fixed), 
to update them according to evolving traffic conditions and other new information. In 
that case, TFMS will evaluate the updated TOS’s and possibly find new solutions. If 
any are found, they will notify the flight operators of the changes. 
Given any particular set of flight dispositions, the flight operators can determine the 
impact the solution has on their operations, and they might decide to cancel a flight, 
or ask for substitution. In the latter case, TFMS will check the feasibility of the 
proposed substitution and will give the associated flights their new assigned routes, 
departure times and slots if it is possible. Ultimately, the flight operator will file a 





Collaborative Airspace Constraint Resolution 
The Collaborative Airspace Constraint Resolution (CACR) concept extends the 
capabilities of the Collaborative Trajectory Options Program (CTOP) by managing 
flights within 45 minutes prior to departure and with adequate automation assistance 
provided to traffic managers for defining airspace constraints (Metron Aviation 
2012).  According to Stalnaker et al. (2009) CACR has four key components: 
• Predicts sector demand and takes into account its uncertainty 
• Predicts sector capacity and potential impact adverse weather will have 
• Identifies the problem 
• Generates congestion resolution initiatives 
CACR will also be implemented under the CDM framework since it will collect and 
incorporate user preferences in terms of enhanced Trajectories Options Sets (TOSs). 
The last two initiatives are of particular importance for this dissertation because they 
motivate the second proposed area of work, that of designing a simpler language of 
exchange between the FAA and carriers by which some carrier preferences can be 
incorporated into the capacity allocation process. The first and third aims of the 
dissertation were to develop new modeling methods for delay prediction and to assess 
the benefits associated with improved efficiency, particularly as it relates to the 
predictability of the system. As will be seen below, the first part is mainly concerned 
with predicting delays at a course scale where details of specific traffic management 




the natural capacity of the airport and runway configuration or the reduced capacity 
imposed by a Ground Delay Program) are enough to make broad predictions of 
delays at an airport. The third part of the dissertation is aimed at benefits assessment, 
in this case in response to technological innovations that might improve the 
predictability of the system. This is likely to be addressed at both strategic and 
tactical scales, so some consideration of the details of traffic management initiatives 
may be warranted. 
1.3 Scope of Work  
The scope of this dissertation is to look closer at a threefold approach to the problem 
of congestion in aviation mentioned above. In part, this is predicated on the fact that 
three separate sponsored research projects have already been conducted, each of 
which provides the fodder for a specific line of inquiry in the dissertation. The 
common thread between the three is airspace congestion and the management thereof. 
The first effort is the prediction of delays and the development of a model that will 
make these predictions under a wide variety of distributional assumptions. This work 
was conducted as part of a NASA-sponsored project whose purpose was to develop 
queuing models as a means of assessing how precise adherence to 4D trajectories, 
that specify current and future aircraft position, will affect capacity and delay in the 
NAS. The focus of this effort was specifically on a continuum approximation using 





The second part of the work effort proposed herein was initiated as part of an 
Aviation Cooperative Research Program (ACRP) fellowship that was awarded to Ms. 
Vlachou. Her proposed research topic for that fellowship was the design of a 
parsimonious language of exchange, with accompanying allocation mechanisms that 
allow carriers and the FAA to work together quickly, in a CDM environment, to 
allocate scarce capacity resources. 
The third portion of the dissertation derives from a research project sponsored by the 
FAA that is only recently completed. The overall goal of that project was to develop 
metrics and assessment methods for technological innovations that might effect an 
improvement in predictability in various dimensions of the NAS. The scope of this 
work was specifically to assess the monetary benefits of improvements to 
predictability as manifested through carriers’ scheduled block times. 
1.3.1 Prediction of Delays 
Studies of queuing delays in the National Airspace System (NAS), and other large 
networks, for that matter, are typically conducted either in a Monte Carlo simulation 
environment, where a considerable amount of fidelity is available at the expense of 
computational efficiency, or with closed-form equilibrium queuing models fraught 
with distributional assumptions that are typically not very representative of real 
situations. A common example of the latter is the use of the Poisson process to 
represent arrival processes to queues, motivated by its mathematical tractability, even 




1.3.1.1 Existing Queuing Models 
One well-known aviation queuing model is LMINET (Lee et al., 1997, 1998), in 
which a network of airport queues is represented by means of interconnected single-
server queues. Each queue has a time-dependent Poisson arrival process, and an 
Erlang-k service process. One serious problem with this approach is that because the 
input process to each downstream node is Poisson, one cannot have independent 
control of its mean and variance. Thus, while the outputs from upstream nodes may 
have variances different than what the Poisson process would be constrained to, the 
model cannot enforce these properly. More importantly, any technologies or policies 
that might be adopted to reduce variance in the system (such as improved trajectory 
accuracy) cannot be modeled accurately. The goal of this part of the dissertation is to 
provide a single-airport building block that might eventually be extended to a network 
environment, and that would allow for modeling of more complex and dependent 
interactions between aviation network nodes. 
Another single-airport queuing model commonly used in aviation is the DELAYS 
model developed at MIT, the methodology behind which is captured in Kivestu 
(1976), Horanjic (1990), and Malone (1995). This model uses a time-dependent 
Poisson arrival process and an Erlang-k service process, much the same as LMINET 
(both models have a common heritage). One major difference is that the DELAYS 
model was later adopted for a network structure that does not suffer from the same 
independence problems as outlined for LMINET. The Approximate Network Delays 
(AND) model was originally proposed in Malone (1995), but was not assembled into 




AND model is that the DELAYS model, by itself, might produce excessively large 
estimates of delay, when fed purely scheduled arrival times. In reality, the network 
would not permit such large delays, as demands would be spread over time due to 
controller actions, metering by upstream queues, etc. Thus, the AND model iterates 
between the DELAYS model and a delay propagation algorithm, in an effort to find 
an estimate that more closely matches expectations. This is a heuristic approach, and 
it still suffers from the drawback this research is intended to address, which is the 
strong dependence between arrival process mean and variance. 
Another aviation queuing model is the National Airspace System Performance 
Analysis Capability (NASPAC), which was developed beginning in the 1980s by the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and Mitre Corporation. A good description of 
the original model can be found in Millner (1993). The model is now housed at the 
FAA, and continues to be developed (see for example Post et al., 2008). The model 
includes a number of detailed components, such as realistic fleet information, fuel 
burn, etc., but its queuing engine is quite rudimentary, consisting of a simple 
deterministic queue with scalar capacity values for the airports. The claimed path 
forward to dealing with real stochastic queuing effects is to incorporate Monte Carlo 
simulation (Post et al., 2008), which will seriously impact the computational 
complexity of the model, as described above. 
1.3.2 Delay Mitigation 
As presented earlier, FAA implements various Traffic Management Initiatives (TMIs) 
in order to mitigate problems that arise due to the demand-capacity imbalance in the 




Program (CTOP), which is about to start being implemented and has as a great 
advantage the increased participation of the airlines in order to determine which flight 
is assigned to which slot. A piece of work that considered this feature (the extensive 
listing of airlines preferences), was conducted by Vakili (2009). In this research she 
considered a detailed way for airlines to express their preferences, where she 
provided for each flight in which priority they will be assigned to which slots. Then 
she presented various resource allocations mechanisms, other than Ration-by-
Schedule, that take into account these preferences and allocate the slots to flights.  
The allocation mechanism she proposed falls into a category of methods designed for 
fair treatment of claimants to, and allocation of, a scarce resource and this subject has 
received considerable attention in the applied economics literature. One of the more 
well-known problems is the apportionment problem, which exists when a set of 
indivisible objects must be distributed among numerous claimants in proportion to 
their claims (Young 1994). 
1.3.3 Improved Predictability Will Ultimately Lead to Reduced Delays 
The Federal Aviation Administration continues an effort to address customer 
requirements. One such requirement is to be accountable for the quality of service 
provided. The Office of Performance Analysis and Strategy contributes to the FAA’s 
success by analyzing and monitoring performance through existing metrics and 
proposing new metrics that better evaluate National Aviation System efficiency and 




The FAA has identified 11 categories of system performance indicators: access and 
equity, capacity, cost-effectiveness, efficiency, environment, flexibility, global 
interoperability, safety, predictability, security, participation by the Air Traffic 
Management community (FAA 2011b). The one that has gained more attention lately 
is flight predictability and the work covered by this effort is contributing to research 
of the flight predictability concept in aviation.  
By increasing flight predictability, airlines should experience significant benefits, 
mostly because this will allow them to reduce their scheduled block times. Scheduled 
block time is a major driver for crew costs and usage of equipment. Part of this 
research was to investigate how airlines set their scheduled block times. This will 
allow the examination of potential benefits for the airlines, at a strategic level, when 
the scheduled block times will be reduced because of the increased predictability in 
the system. Also by reducing the actual block time there will be benefits in the day-
of-operations level, where the passenger delays will be reduced and regarding the 
crew perspective there will be less overtime and fewer crew time-outs. 
1.3.3.1 Defining Predictability 
There is some work done in the past related to flight predictability. The term flight 
predictability is defined in ICAO (2005) as “the ability of airspace users and ATM 
service providers to provide consistent and dependable levels of performance. 
Predictability is essential to airspace users as they develop and operate their 
schedules”. In another report by Bolczak et al. (2007) predictability measures how the 




Most of the studies in the literature for aviation and public transit that use 
predictability metrics are dealing with travel times. There are some that use delay and 
flights per day to quantify predictability, or the lack thereof. Following we summarize 
the metrics in each category. 
Flight/Travel Times 
In the work of Gulding et al. (2009) flight predictability is measured as the difference 
between the 80th and 20th percentiles of the distributions for taxi-out, en route, and 
taxi-in times. In this work they have broken the flight into different phases and 
considered one metric for each of them. In another report (Bolczak et al., 1997) 
predictability is defined as the deviation of ground movement times, the statistical 
spread of ground movement times and the statistical deviation of en route times. 
According to an ATSP Focus Group report (1999), a predictability metric considered 
is the ratio of the actual flight time to the scheduled flight time.  
There are also studies related to predictability in public transit. In Taylor (1982), a 
metric for travel time variability is defined as the coefficient of variation (the ratio of 
the standard deviation to the mean) of travel time. In another work by Uniman et al. 
(2010), they consider the reliability from the passengers’ perspective and they define 
it as the standard deviation of the travel time distribution. They also introduce the 
notion of the Reliability Buffer Time (RBT) metric, which is the buffer time that 
passengers must allow above their typical travel time to arrive on time with a 
specified level of certainty. This is analogous to air carriers building buffers into the 





A study that considers delay as a metric for flight predictability is by Gulding et al. 
(2009). They define that predictability is measured from the flight perspective as the 
difference between the 80th and 20th percentiles for pre-departure delay and arrival 
delay. In the report by Bolczak et al. (1997) predictability is measured by the arrival, 
departure and overflight delay. Predictability is assumed to be a measure of the 
variance between the planned and realized delay in a report by Ball et al. (2011). 
Flight per Day 
Finally there is a report by EUROCONTROL (2003) where they consider the 
seasonal and hourly variability as metrics for flight predictability. In more detail the 
metrics considered for the seasonal variability are the ratio of summer to winter 
traffic in flights per day and the ratio of traffic in the peak week to the average. For 
the hourly variation they define it as the ratio of the average hourly traffic to the 
average in the peak three hours. 
1.4 Organization of the Document 
In Chapter 2, the modeling effort for the delay prediction is presented. In Chapter 3 
the allocation mechanism developed to reduce delays during severe enroute weather 
is presented, which takes into account the preferences of the airlines. In Chapter 4 the 
work done regarding identifying the benefits for the airlines as a result of increased 
predictability in the system is presented. Chapter 5 presents the conclusions, and 




Chapter 2: Delay Prediction 
Air traffic system undergoes a continuous transformation by shifting to smarter, 
satellite-based and more advanced technologies (FAA, 2013b). An important feature 
of the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) is the use of four-
dimensional trajectories (4D Trajectories). Aircraft position will be known not only in 
space but also in time. This will increase the precision of the operations and lead to 
the reduction of the required spacing between the aircraft. Currently the system is 
stochastic and with 4D Trajectories in place will move to a more deterministic 
system. The queuing models that are more suitable to predict delays in the current 
state are stochastic in nature and based on solutions of differential equations. Delays 
in the future, when everything will be more predictable, will be best modeled with 
deterministic models. 
As precision increases – and the system is moving from the stochastic state to the 
more deterministic-, the airspace capacity also will increase and this will lead to 
reduced delays. As is was shown in the work of Hansen et al. (2009), the delay 
reduction as it is derived by comparing a stochastic and a deterministic queuing 
model will be of the order of 35%. Poisson models are great to capture the stochastic 
nature of the system and set the lower boundary of the system’s performance. 
Deterministic on the other hand are the upper boundary. The work conducted here 
presents the creation of a model that will be the intermediate part. The evolution of 
models capturing the increased precision can be seen in Figure 2.1. In the future with 
more precision in place, mean will remain the same but variance will reduce, so it is 
was desired to be able to handle mean and variance independently and diffusion 





Figure 2.1 Queuing models under various degree of precision 
With the aviation system in mind, the idea behind this research was to adapt a 
common continuous approximation technique known as the diffusion approximation 
to a queuing problem, with a specific interest in modeling arrival and departure delay 
statistics at an airport over the course of several hours or a day. The primary 
advantages of using the diffusion approximation for these purposes are that specific 
distributional assumptions can be relaxed in favor of an approximate description of 
the relevant stochastic processes by a small number of their time-dependent moments, 
that the full spectrum of probabilistic results can be obtained via a single run of the 
model, and that propagation of higher moments beyond the mean queue behavior can 
be captured. In general, is believed that it should be possible to represent a network of 
queues using methodology similar to the methods herein, although the results to date 




concise version of the results presented in this chapter is published in Lovell et al. 
(2013). 
2.1 Model Development 
In this section is introduced the modeling assumptions that lead to the particular 
continuum approximation for queuing systems known as the diffusion approximation. 
This consists of a governing differential equation, which is presented first, and which 
represents the primary dynamics of the system. This equation is valid for a closed 
subset of the real numbers representing all realistic values of the system state, but 
some boundary conditions must be imposed to prevent physically meaningless results 
outside of this interval. It is also described the set of initial conditions required to 
represent any particular queuing problem for which a solution is sought. 
2.1.1 Governing Differential Equations 
Diffusion methods have been applied to queuing problems in a variety of domains, 
including road transportation (Newell, 1971), computer networks (Kobayashi, 1974), 
and more general queuing systems (Gaver, 1968 and Kimura 1983). No significant 
use of them in an aviation setting is recorded in the literature. The development of the 
model shown in the following pages borrows very heavily from the exposition of 
Kimura, 1964, which develops the diffusion approximation in the context of a very 
different application, that of population genetics. The reason for following the 
template of that paper, however, is that the treatment is very thorough but also 
accessible to readers without prior experience in diffusion methods, and it can be 




Suppose the arrival process to an airport is modeled as a single-server queue. This is 
admittedly an abstraction, because there are frequently multiple cornerpost entry 
points to an airport, often the possibility of multiple arrival runways, and incoming 
aircraft do not physically line up in queue in the same manner as customers at a 
grocery store, or even vehicles at a traffic signal. Nevertheless, it is common to model 
the competition amongst multiple arriving aircraft for the capacitated resource (the 
arrival runway system) as a queue, with the interpretation that the delays thereby 
imparted are assigned and incurred at en route locations farther away from the airport. 
Let  represent the time-dependent random variable describing the length of the 
(virtual) queue for arrival aircraft at time t. While beyond the scope of this research, 
the ultimate goal of this endeavor is to model more complicated aviation networks. In 
that context, one could use the airport node being described here to model an arrival 
or departure resource like a runway, a gate, or an esoteric en route node intended to 
represent a capacity constraint in the airspace itself. 
The first assumption necessary for consideration of continuum models is that of 
continuity; i.e., that the queue length measurement at any given time need not be an 
integer. Because aircraft only come in discrete units, this is obviously an artificial 
construct. However, it is mostly of interest in using queue length measurements as 
preliminaries to computing delay statistics, so they will be averaged over a large time 
domain. As a result, this assumption is probably no more malignant than assuming 
that there is such a thing as a "queue" at an arrival airport. This is a stochastic queuing 
system, and the probability density function for the queue length x at time t is denoted 




the queue density transitions over the time interval , with a mean that increases 
and then decreases again, and a variance that changes similarly.  
 
Figure 2.2 Queue length probability density function  
The probability density transition function  is also defined as the 
probability density associated with a change in queue length from x to  in the 
time interval . An example of  for a single choice of t and  is shown 









Figure 2.3 State transition probability function  
The density function for the queue length at some future time  can be expressed 
using the continuous Kolmogorov-Chapman equation: 
  (1) 
This equation encapsulates conditioning over all of the possible queue states  at 
time t from which a transition to the state x at time  is possible. The necessary 
assumption to use this equation is that the transition probabilities of the state of the 
queue can be described entirely by the function g, regardless of the history of the 




If the condensed notation  is used, then the integrand of (1) 
can be expanded as a Taylor series around the point x as follows: 
 
 (2) 
Then (2) is substituted back into (1), and integration and differentiation is 




Since g is a proper density function, then for any choices x, t, and , it must be that 
. Hence the first term on the RHS of (3) is simplified, and then f is 
subtracted from both sides and divided by : 
  (4) 
The limits of two of the elements contained in the RHS of (4) are frequently called 
the “infinitesimal” mean and variance, respectively: 
  (5) 




A second assumption is made, which is that all of the important information about the 
transition density function g can be captured adequately in its first and second 
moments, as in (5) and (6), respectively. This is not a severe limitation; for situations 
where this is not the case, additional infinitesimal moments can be defined, and the 
analyst is then responsible for providing that information as well. In fact, in aviation 
applications, the best contemporary network models, such as LMINET (Lee et al., 
1997, 1998) only deal with the propagation of average behavior, and usually with 
independent Poisson processes at each downstream node. Thus, including  is 
already a step forward. For the present case, assuming that the first two moments 
suffice, this is tantamount to the assumption: 
  (7) 
Then, taking the limit of (4) as   and substituting (5) and (6) yields: 
  (8) 
Equation (8) is commonly called the Kolmogorov forward equation in the stochastic 
processes literature, or the Fokker-Planck equation in the physics literature. In the 
second case, the term  is referred to as drift, while the term  is called 
diffusion. Equation (8) is the governing differential equation (GDE) for our queuing 
system. 
2.1.2 Boundary Conditions 
In this section, the boundary conditions are developed to prevent the model from 




negative values of the queue length. A similar constraint can be imposed to prevent 
the possibility of what might be considered unnaturally large queue lengths. The 
upper bound is more difficult to specify precisely, but it is necessary from a 
pragmatic standpoint in the numerical scheme because the solution space must be 
bounded, as will be seen in Section 2.2. It is also practically useful, since air carriers 
use cancellations and other initiatives to protect against unacceptably long delays.   
Because the random variable  represents a queue length, it makes no sense for it 
to be negative. Thus, an auxiliary condition is applied that can guarantee that 
  (9) 
This cannot be accomplished by simply saying that (9) must be true; an additional 
differential equation must be specified that follows the same temporal evolution as (8)
, and whose effect is to guarantee that (9) holds. Assuming that the initial conditions 
obey (9) (as they should, since they are controlled), a way to do this is to guarantee 
that the “net probability flux” (what would be thought of as the mass flux if this were 
a problem in physics) across the point  is always zero.  
A point x is fixed in one dimension and the probability flux across that point in both 
directions is considered. By integrating all possible increasing transitions that cross 
this barrier, and subsequently all possible decreasing transitions that cross the same 
barrier, and then adding them together, lead to the following requirement that the net 
probability flux be zero. This constraint is referred to in the physics or stochastic 
processes literature as a reflecting barrier. 




At all times,  must also be a proper density function: 
  (11) 
  (12) 
These last two conditions are notoriously difficult to enforce in a numerical solution 
scheme (Kumar et al., 2006). This is discussed further in Section 2.2. 
2.1.3 Initial Conditions 
The functions  and  represent the first and second moments, 
respectively, of the rate at which the length of the queue is changing at time t, given 
that its current state is x. In a queuing system where the arrival process is independent 
of the service process, then with the possible exception of  and an upper 
reflecting barrier, there is no reason to suspect that these functions should vary across 
the x dimension. In such situations, it is only necessary to specify how these functions 
change over time. For most aviation applications, for example, one would expect 
 to be positive at the beginning of the day, negative at the end of the day, and 
perhaps with some additional cycles in between. One would expect  to be 
small (approaching zero) at the beginning and end of the day and something larger in 
between, and of course never negative. If this construction was extended to a queuing 
network, these functions could be derived entirely from the outputs  of 





Although negative queues are explicitly prevented, it also makes sense to preclude 
initial conditions that would seem in conflict with this goal. Thus, it is required that 
  (13) 
At any node to which this method is applied, one can imagine that  will be 
computed as the differential of the difference between the arrival rate, which it might 
be got from the outputs of upstream processes, and the departure rate, which is related 
to the capacity of the airport or other resource. This being the case, (13) simply 
prevents an airport from serving traffic that does not exist. 
At some airports, however, the rate of queue growth might depend on its current state. 
For example, at many airports, runway configurations prevail such that the total 
capacity of the airport is divided between arrivals and departures, and the airport has 
some control over that split.  In such cases, when there is an excess of arrivals, the 
airport might choose to emphasize arrivals over departures to ameliorate this queue. 
This is tantamount to a temporary increase in the arrival capacity of the airport. If this 
were repeatable and quantifiable behavior, that could be captured in differences in 
 across different values of x. 
An initial queue length distribution must be specified. For real airport problems, the 
queue is empty at the beginning of the day, so one might require: 
  (14) 
where  is the Dirac delta function. Alternatively, one might consider analyzing a 
problem starting at some other point in the middle of the day, in which case the 




2.2 Numeric Solution Scheme 
In order to solve a system including partial differential equations and their associated 
boundary and initial conditions, a numerical scheme is necessary to convert that 
continuum problem into some discrete form appropriate for solution by computer 
(Pepper and Heinrich, 1992). In this research is presented a discretization method 
based on the well-known finite element method (FEM) (with some elements of finite 
differences included as well) that is appropriate for this problem. The construction of 
numeric schemes for PDEs is very much an art, and certainly a host of other schemes 
could be attempted, including methods relying entirely on finite differences. The 
colloquial understanding of the competition between finite element (FE) methods and 
finite difference (FD) methods is that the former allows for an exact solution to an 
approximation of the problem, while the latter allows for an approximate solution to 
the exact problem.  Neither is considered uniformly better than the other, and they 
both certainly have their proponents. 
The FEM scheme developed for this problem consists of transforming the governing 
differential equation with its boundary and initial conditions into linear algebraic 
equations that can be solved at every time step. This transformation is possible by 
constructing a discrete approximation to the queue length density function  
using the N Lagrange basis functions . Each basis function has a triangular 
shape; the collection of them is illustrated in Figure 2.4 for . Mathematically, 







The approximation for f can then be expressed using these basis functions as: 
  (15) 
where L is the number of time steps , N is the number of Lagrange basis functions, 
and  are the parameters of the approximation. Using the finite element method, 
the “solution” of the problem essentially amounts to determining the values .  
 
Figure 2.4 Lagrange basis functions for the finite element method 
Using a finite difference approach, the left hand side of the PDE (8) can now be 
approximated by: 
 , 






The equation (16) is enforced by defining the residue r, which is essentially the 
difference between the LHS and RHS of (16), 
  
The residue is enforced to zero by using a test function . All of the projections 
of the residue on w are equate to be zero; i.e., where  is the domain of 
interest in x and  its boundary. Integrating by parts yields: 
 
 (17) 
where the last term on the RHS depends on the boundary conditions. 
It is assumed that the interval is closed, and that at the right boundary , and is 
desired the net probability flux to be 0. For some large l, the probability density 
function will approach 0 for all . This will make the net probability flux 
approach zero at , although it cannot be absolutely guaranteed. This is discussed 
more in the conclusions.  Together with equation (10), we conclude: 
 . 













In the last two equations, is denoted  and suppressed the dependence of 
the basis functions  on x for the sake of clarity. As mentioned before, it is also 
assumed that the function  is constant in x. 




The solution of (20) is the set of parameters  which define  according to 
(15). One of the advantages of the finite element method is the ability to solve these 
algebraic equations element by element. The N Lagrange basis function approximation 





The two remaining boundary conditions to enforce on the solution are (11) and (12). 
As described in Kumar et al. (2006), equation (12) is enforced by scaling the solution 
appropriately. The non-negativity constraint is harder to enforce. One possible solution 
is the partition of unity finite element method (PUFEM), described in Kumar et al. 
(2006). For the time being, however, the problems solved here always result in 
positively valued density functions, and they solve very quickly, so a more complex 
solution method is not justified unless that situation changes. 
2.3 Model Validation and Results 
In this section, some results are showed of applying the modeling with different input 
data sets. In order to validate this model, Monte Carlo simulation is used as ground 
truth. The simulation ran a number of iterations (1000 and 10,000) and averaged over 
this number in order to get the mean and the variance of the queue length. The first 
set of experiments involves comparisons against the steady state M/M/1 queue. This 
is not a very useful system for modeling airports, but because the stationary moments 
are known, it can demonstrate that the diffusion model converges to the proper 
equilibrium solution, so it is useful from a validation perspective. 
Figure 2.5 shows how the results from the diffusion model compare to the results 
from the Monte Carlo model. The latter results are for an M/M/1 queue with arrival 
rate  aircraft/hour, and a service rate of  aircraft/hour.  The traffic 
intensity is thus . The equilibrium queue length is then given by: 
  





Both the Monte Carlo and the diffusion results obviously converge to these values, 
although the diffusion model does so much more smoothly. That is because in this 
figure, only 1000 replications of the Monte Carlo simulation were conducted, hence a 
certain amount of noise around the equilibrium values. Figure 2.6 shows similar 
results for Monte Carlo runs with 10,000 replications instead. 
 
 




Observe that as the number of replications for the Monte Carlo simulation increases, 
it follows much better the diffusion solution and the equilibrium solution. One 
important advantage of the diffusion model is the solution time. The Monte Carlo 
simulation required 10.86 seconds for 1000 runs and 106.9 seconds for 10,000 runs. 
The diffusion model completes in one iteration, which takes about 8.2 seconds. 
 
 
Figure 2.6 M/M/1 queue with 10,000 replications,  
In Figure 2.7, are shown results for some realistic airport demand and supply profiles. 




International Airport, from a peak day in 2007. The capacity profile is a single cluster 
from a k-means cluster analysis on airport arrival rates (AARs), generated using the 
methodology shown in Liu et al. (2008). These demand and capacity data have been 
used for previous studies on queuing see for example Hansen et al. (2009). The 
arrival data show considerable fluctuation over the course of the day, while the 
capacity profile is nearly flat. The arrival process was modeled as a non-stationary 
Poisson process, and the service process as a non-stationary Erlang-k process, with 
. This was done for two reasons, first to show that the diffusion model produces 
good results with different distribution assumptions, and second because this has been 
shown to be a reasonable model for a single airport server process in other literature 
(see for example Malone and Odoni, 2001). The Monte Carlo results include 1000 
replications. The reason simulation was used to compare our results and not real data, 
is that real data include propagated delays (Churchill et al. 2008), and that would 
make the results not directly comparable. 
From observation of the figure, one can tell that the diffusion model replicates the 
Monte Carlo ground truth quite well, in both the first and second moments. This is a 






Figure 2.7 Diffusion and Monte Carlo queuing results for Miami International Airport 
The final results come from a peak day at Chicago O’Hare International Airport. 
These results are shown in Figure 2.8. The demand profile is very oscillatory, and it 
frequently surpasses the capacity over the first three quarters of the day. Thus, larger 
mean queue lengths are to be expected. The demand subsides towards the end of the 
day. The smooth oscillations of the service rate between 22 and 23 aircraft per hour 
are an artifact of specifying integer 15-minute service rates derived from hourly rates 




moments of the queue length over time match quite closely between the diffusion and 
the Monte Carlo models. 
For both of these last two sets of results, the Monte Carlo runs complete in about 31 
seconds, and the diffusion runs in about 8 seconds. The time required for the Monte 
Carlo runs is directly proportional to the number of replications, so if more precision 
were required, for example 10,000 runs, then the run time would be closer to 310 
seconds. The diffusion model is immune to these considerations. 
 






The research has presented the mathematical construction of a continuum 
approximation to a queuing system that might represent a single congested resource 
in the National Airspace System, such as an airport, a runway, or some en route 
resource. The result is derived from the diffusion approximation. A numeric solution 
scheme based on the finite element method is also shown. 
The use of this type of approximation requires one to be comfortable with some of the 
assumptions made in the research, such as the willingness to consider non-integer 
queue lengths. That notwithstanding, the method has seen considerable application in 
other areas of queuing theory that also deal with countable objects, so this assumption 
is not unique to the aviation context. 
This result is a stepping-stone in what will hopefully be a larger system of inquiry 
into the use of such continuum approximations to study systems of aviation queues. 
In particular, the ability to model the propagation of both the mean and the variance 
of delay statistics through a connected network would mark a major leap forward in 
the performance analysis of the aviation system. 
In this study a validation effort of the model is conducted. It was feasible to replicate 
the known steady-state results from that small set of queuing systems for which 
equilibrium results are known in closed form. The results in such cases showed that 
the diffusion approximation gives exactly the same results very quickly. Furthermore, 
a Monte Carlo exercise was also conducted for a number of other cases whose 










Chapter 3: Incorporating Airlines’ Preferences in Resource 
Allocation Mechanisms During Irregular Operations 
3.1 Motivation for this Research  
As mentioned in the first section of this dissertation a couple of new and promising 
Traffic Management Initiatives are about to start being implemented; i.e. the 
Collaborative Trajectories Options Program (CTOP) and the Collaborative Airspace 
Constraint Resolution (CACR). When these systems are fully implemented, there will 
be a capability at the FAA to allow carrier preferences to affect the allocation of 
constrained airspace resources. However it is not clear whether (FAA 2011a) carriers 
will be able to generate full and robust sets of trajectory alternatives on the fly, with 
associated costs, in response to suddenly changing capacity conditions, and (Ball and 
Lulli 2004) that such information, even if it could be generated, could be exploited in 
a systematic optimization of resource allocation. This is the motivation for the work 
presented in this research. A mechanism is proposed by which simpler, yet still 
useful, information could be submitted by carriers, and an algorithm is demonstrated 
that directly employs this information to influence the capacity allocation process. 
Also extensions are proposed for both the way that airlines can submit their 
preferences and the resource allocation algorithm. Finally the long run effect of using 
the proposed allocation mechanism with this preference structure is tested. A version 





3.2 Feedback from Airline Experts 
Part of this research was to find a meaningful way for carriers to express some 
preference structure - which flight-slot assignments are preferable for them - that 
would be different than the exchange language used in CTOP (TOS’s). Since airlines 
play an important role in this program, input from experts from the aviation industry 
and airlines was sought in order to get their feedback and opinions regarding the 
usefulness of CTOP and more insight into what they would prefer, or what might not 
be very attractive to them with the existing structure. The latter will be a starting point 
in order to find a different way for carriers to express their priorities.  
A number of people working for airlines were contacted via email and by phone and 
those who kindly provided their feedback are: 
Jim Hamilton – Air Traffic System manager with UPS 
George Kypreos – SOC sector manager at American Airlines 
Frank Ketcham – Pilot with Delta Airlines and commercial aviation specialist 
Don Wolford - Primary instructor for the United Airlines Flight Dispatch 
ATC coordinator desk and the flight operator lead on the CDM Future 
Concepts of TFM working group 
Mark Hopkins - General Manager, ATM/CDM at Delta Airlines and chairman 
of the CDM Stakeholders Group (CSG) 
There was an agreement in all opinions that the philosophy behind CTOP is 
something good since it gives some control to the airlines and airlines will benefit 
from it. Their operations will benefit because they will be able to recover better from 




for the passengers. Passenger satisfaction is one of the top priorities for all airlines. 
Another top priority was to keep the schedule intact. Some of the interviewees 
referred to their business models without revealing of course much information. Some 
of the things taken into consideration are the passenger connections, crew scheduling, 
and fuel burn. 
From these discussions some concerns were expressed. The first one was about the 
amount of information that airlines have to share while expressing the various 
trajectory options sets. Also there was a concern for the extra workload that 
dispatchers will have to absorb in order to create the trajectory options, probably 
necessitating the hiring of additional people to perform this task. 
Another concern that was brought up is that some airlines will be hesitant to provide 
information, invest, and participate in this program if there is no analysis that will 
show them that it is worth the investment, e.g., that it will be a money saver. Finally, 
another concern had to do with how equitable this will be and how for example 
international flights and pop-ups will be treated.  
3.3 Expressing Airlines Priorities 
It was ascertained from some of the interviewees that one of the issues surrounding 
incorporating carriers’ preferences into a collaborative decision-making setting is 
that, while they would like the final allocation to be sensitive to their wishes, they 
would prefer not to articulate those wishes in such a clear manner that their internal 
business models might be discerned. Currently in CTOP airlines have to give great 
amount of detail about route text, altitude, speed, departure time, as depicted in the 




obscure ways of expressing preference information, with the hope that they can be 
just as powerful in injecting carrier preferences into the allocation process. By 
making the language simpler, this also addresses to an extent the concerns about the 
extra workload that dispatchers will have in order to create and submit the detailed 
options, or the updated TOS’s. As mentioned above, this will not necessarily mean 
that the usefulness and the effectiveness of this tool is compromised or diminished. 
For example, one very simple mechanism that was investigated requires each airline 
to give to each of their flights a priority number ranging from 1 to 4. The greater the 
number assigned to a flight the more important this flight is. An extension requires 
that for each flight, carriers specify the maximum delay in minutes that they would 
allow it to be assigned on the ground. In Table 3.1 it can be seen an example of how 
an airline A, that had initially scheduled 6 flights to pass through the affected area 
within a two hour frame, can provide this information. The estimated time of arrival 
is the time that the flight would have reached the FCA boundary if there were no bad 
weather in the area. 
Here must be mentioned that in addition to the preference language being different, 
the resource allocation mechanism will also be different (compared to the RBS 
paradigm that is currently used) in order to make use of the priorities. The details of 
the algorithm are not defined yet, which will be the next step for this research, but 
what it will do is to pick the flights with the highest priorities first and assign them to 
slots. Going back to the example, in this list, airline A, for its first flight ( ), will 
give a priority number 3, and for its second flight ( ), a priority number 4, which 




Table 3.1 Example of list with Airline Priorities 
Flight 




Max Delay Allowed 
(min) 
fA1 3:04 3 35 
fA2 3:15 4 25 
fA3 3:40 4 23 
fA4 3:48 3 32 
fA5 4:12 2 50 
fA6 4:30 3 33 
 
If the slot assigned to a flight is much later than the initial estimated time of arrival, 
so that the maximum delay allowed is exceeded then this flight will get rerouted and 
another flight from the same airline will get the slot. Again this flight will have a 
higher priority number than the others yet unassigned and its maximum delay allowed 
will not be violated. 
Since the number of flights that are scheduled to pass through the FCA is reduced, 
each airline will have fewer flights passing through that area for the duration it is 
expected to last. Since some of their flights will be more important than others, 
airlines have no reason to claim that all their flights have the same high priority 
number. Also it is important to understand that airlines do not compete with the other 
airlines for a specific slot, so there is no point in submitting fallacious information. 




A flight of an airline with priority 4 does not compete with a flight with priority 4 of 
another airline. Importantly, such a scheme would not be useful in trying to game the 
system into ensuring that all their flights will go thought the FCA. Some of the flights 
will be pushed back in time and if they have intentionally given big priority numbers 
to flights that are not important, they essentially allow less important flights to pass 
the FCA before their more important ones. If all the flights are given the same priority 
number and high allowable delay, then the slots would end up being assigned 
following the Ration-By-Scheduled (RBS) method, as it is being currently used. This 
essentially would cancel the allocation mechanism proposed here and the potential 
benefits for the airlines to give priority to flights they are more important. Also, if the 
maximum allowed delay is set unreasonably small, then the flights – especially the 
ones further down the duration of the program - might not be able to be assigned to a 
slot. This will cause slots to go unused. 
The times of the slots are not known in advance, so airlines cannot request specific 
flight-slot assignments. By giving a priority number and a maximum delay allowed, 
the airlines are given the chance to prioritize their flights without the need to reveal 
any information of why one flight is more important than the other. At the same time 
they are given some flexibility as to which slot they can get. For example from the 
above table it can be seen that the first flight was initially scheduled for 3:04 and is 
given a 35 minute allowance of delay, which means it will be considered in the 
system if it is given a slot before 3:39. For illustration purposes, assume that available 




have a number of possible slot assignments that will be within the desired time 
window.  
There is always the option of substitutions among the flights of the same airline after 
slots have been assigned to flights. One advantage of prioritizing the flights with the 
way suggested here is that it may reduce the need and the number for substitutions. 
Looking again at the example, flight  has priority number 4 and flight has 
priority 3. With the allocation mechanism that is considered developing,  will get 
picked first to get the first available slot for that airline  and then flight  would 
get the second one . Without this prioritization scheme the first flight  would 
get  and flight  would get slot , and the airline later would have to ask for 
the swap. 
3.4 Allocation Mechanism  
Assuming that the FAA has a list of all flights determined to be affected by an FCA, 
and also has the accompanying preference information for those flights garnered from 
their respective carriers, the next proposed step is an allocation mechanism by which 
a subset of those flights would be allowed to use the FCA, and the provided 
information would play a role in that decision. It is not declared explicitly what 
happens to flights not captured in the AFP – carriers could choose to re-route them 
around the FCA, cancel them altogether, or re-schedule them to use the airspace in 
question at a later time.  If enough flights elected to take extended ground delays, 
then presumably the FAA would have to extend the FCA or create a new one, as long 




The allocation mechanism for airspace slots proposed by Vakili (2009) and is the 
basis for the allocation portion of this work. She had proposed an allocation scheme, 
called Preference Based Proportional Random Allocation (PBPRA), which was 
proven to be fair, equitable, and immune to gaming, and she used a different way for 
airlines to submit their preferences. The PBPRA is a two-step process: 
Step 1: Determine the fair share of the constrained resource set for each carrier, 
using the original schedule as the basis of fairness 
Step 2: Allocate flights to slots in a manner consistent with the fair share 
determined in Step 1. 
The allocation mechanism tested in this research is consistent in motivation and basic 
construction with PBPRA.  In the first step, the amount of claim is determined that 
each carrier has on each available slot – in other words, a number that should, in the 
long run, be proportional to the number of times that carrier is allocated that slot, 
under identical circumstances. 
For example, consider the case where several carriers have flights, not previously 
assigned to slots, which can feasibly reach the FCA in time for a given slot.  Each 
carrier can be thought of as having some “claim” on that slot.  In trying to assign a 
numeric value to the claim of a particular carrier, one might consider allowing that 
number to depend on such things as the total number of flights that carrier has 
scheduled through the FCA that can feasibly use that slot, the number of flights owned 




Here is an example of how fair share is computed. Let’s assume that there are 6 ( ) 
flights from 3 different ( ) carriers  that are 
scheduled to arrive at the boundary of the FCA in the following times 
respectively. The time of available slots ( ) due to 
reduced capacity are . The earliest slot that each 
flight can be assigned to is . Then the total number of flights  
that can be assigned to each slot is estimated by , where 
. 
Then the share of each flight for each slot is computed by 
, where  is the earliest slot the flight  can 
be assigned to and  is the number of flights that can be assigned to the respective 
slot. For example the share of the first flight  for the second slot  is 
. Then the next step is to find the total share 
of each flight to all slots and by adding these shares, the total fair share for each airline 
is computed. For this example, the final total fair share ( ) for each airline is 
.  
A carrier can only have a claim for a slot if it has flights that can feasibly reach the 
edge of the FCA in time for that slot.  Furthermore, is not allowed a flight to count 




flight into that slot exceeds the carrier’s declared maximum allowable delay for that 
flight.  This is another departure from the PBPRA algorithm described in Vakili 
(2009).  Thus, for each slot, is identified which flights are feasible, and therefore 
which carriers have some claim to that slot. 
This mechanism ensures that all slots will be assigned to flights, as long as the 
maximum allowable delay is set reasonably.  Additionally, since the number of 
available slots is less than the number of scheduled flights, the fair share for each 
airline will be a smaller number than their initial number of flights.  The fair share is 
likely not to be integer-valued, as was shown in the example above. 
When this initial step is completed, the fair share, or claim, that each carrier has on 
each slot has been computed.  A carrier with many flights scheduled through the FCA 
might have a claim of something like 2.4 on a slot later in the program, while a carrier 
with less presence might have just a fractional claim of 0.25, for example.  If this 
situation were to repeat itself over time, it would be expected the carrier with the 2.4 
claim to be assigned the slot much more often than the one with the 0.25 claim 
(approximately 10 times as often).  Because the smaller claim is not zero, however, the 
algorithm does not allow that carrier to be systematically denied that slot. 
In the next step, slots are assigned to carriers, and then to specific flights.  It begins by 
allocating only the fractional shares; the integer shares are allocated later.  There is a 
specific reason for doing so.  A carrier with a very small share to a slot, by virtue of 
having very few flights captured in the program, would be very unlikely to receive 
that slot by way of a deterministic allocation mechanism.  As a result, there would be 




(or be declared) with some geographic regularity, due to recurrent congestion or 
recurrent weather patterns.  Since there are strong geographic patterns to carriers’ 
networks, this conspires to produce noticeable patterns in the extent to which carriers 
are represented in AFPs.  This process of considering fractional shares first, coupled 
with the proportion-based assignment described below, obviates this bias. 
A random process is used to assign a slot to a carrier, where each carrier’s probability 
of being chosen is proportional to its fair share.  Thus, a carrier’s expected return is 
equal to its fair share, while its actual return in any particular AFP may differ from 
that.  Again, in the first step is considered only the fractional shares.  Once all 
carriers’ shares have been reduced to integer values, the algorithm continues, 
considering their remaining integer shares until all slots have been allocated. 
Once a carrier has been allocated a slot, the particular flight allocated to that slot is 
the one with the highest priority (as stated by the carrier itself) that is feasible for that 
slot.  That flight is then removed from further consideration, as is that slot, and the 
process continues.  This process ensures that carriers’ preferences play a role, but not 
in such a way that there would be any advantage to gaming the priority numbers 
claimed by the carriers – they are only used to measure relative worth within a given 
carrier’s own stable of flights.  This is a further departure from the mechanism of 
Vakili (2009), which did not consider carrier priorities. 
3.5 Trade-Off Between Slot Quantity and Minimizing Delay  
For the purpose of this research, is also proposed an enhanced version of this 
allocation scheme, which is called Alternative Preference Based Proportional 




allocation mechanism will also be a two-step process, and the first step is identical to 
PBPRA.  In this scheme, however, each airline is allowed, when declaring its 
preferences, to also declare its intent to be considered as one of two different kinds of 
airlines: those that would prefer getting earlier slots (at a cost of depleting their fair 
share faster), and those that would prefer getting a larger number of slots overall, with 
the understanding that some of those will likely have large delays associated with 
them. For a particular AFP, this would allow carriers with a nearby hub and some 
higher priority connecting flights, for example, to choose to be treated differently than 
a regional carrier whose main concern is keeping the breadth of their schedule and 
moving their airframes to the next intended destination. So this consists of an 
additional airline preference input along with the flight priority number and the 
maximum allowable delay.  
This modified scheme can be related to the first proposed scheme by imagining that 
in the first scheme, the “price” of each slot is one point of fair share, while in this 
second or modified scheme is allowed that “price” to be higher for carriers that prefer 
to be allocated a smaller number of premium slots.  The allocation mechanism is 
modified so that when an airline of this type is chosen to be assigned a slot, it is also 
assigned to the slot that its next most valuable flight can use, albeit at a significant 
cost (for example two units of fair share). 
As mentioned above, airlines always have the option of substitutions among their 
own flights after slots have been assigned to flights. It might be the case that, after 
looking at the resulting allocation, a carrier has a slightly different view of its relative 




make swaps amongst its own assigned slots if it saw fit and if those swaps were 
feasible. 
3.6 Results 
The two allocation schemes (PBPRA and A-PBPRA) are compared to two schemes 
that can be thought of as representative of how AFPs are currently handled.  One is a 
straightforward application of RBS, which is a presumption of what the FAA would 
do if it had no information on preferences whatsoever.  The second is a proxy for 
RBS with intra-carrier substitutions allowed (RBS with substitutions). This process is 
mimicked by making first an RBS allocation, and then use the flight priorities to 
make an optimal assignment of flights to slots within each carrier’s holdings. 
The methodology is tested with a hypothetical AFP with a realistic sized FCA and a 
realistic capacity reduction.  The AFP time is set to be 2 hours, and tested 3 different 
scenarios for capacity reduction: 25, 20, and 15 aircraft per hour, respectively. This is 
out of a nominal flow of approximately 30 aircraft per hour. Hypothetical carriers 
were invented, and in order to properly represent the variety of share sizes that each 
might have in an AFP, actual data were considered on flights into the Boston Logan 
airport, from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS 2012).  From this the mean 






















Because each of the proposed schemes ensures that all AFP slots are utilized, there is 
no difference between these mechanisms and any version of RBS that differs in the 
efficiency with which the capacitated resource is used.  It is not claimed that flights 
that are not given a slot in the 2-hour time period of the allocation mechanism are 
necessarily re-routed, delayed further, or cancelled, either for the proposed 
mechanisms or for the RBS mechanisms to which they are compared. The 




performance metrics, therefore, relate only to those flights captured in the 2-hour 
period of the AFP.  
First the results from PBPRA are compared with the results from RBS and RBS with 
intra-carrier substitutions. The metric chosen for the comparison is the total weighted 
delay, which is computed by multiplying the delay for each flight by its priority 
number and summing across flights. For example, if a flight with priority number 3 
was delayed for 9 minutes, its weighted delay would be 27. Since the PBPRA 
mechanism is a randomized procedure, each scenario is ran 100 times in a Monte 
Carlo simulation in Matlab and the average for each metric used is computed. 
 
Figure 3.1 Total weighted delay for RBS, RBS with substitutions and PBPRA for 
each capacity scenario 
In Figure 3.1 the total weighted delay accrued by the number of flights that were 




PBPRA compared to RBS and RBS with substitutions. RBS with substitutions 
performs better than RBS since flights with higher priority get earlier slots than 
initially assigned. With PBPRA not only are higher priority flights assigned earlier, 
but they are also assigned much closer to the desired slots in order to minimize the 
total delay.  
To see how the allocation schemes compare, Figure 3.2 presents the weighted (by the 
priority number of each flight) average delay in minutes per flight for RBS, RBS with 
Substitutions and PBPRA. As capacity decreases the weighted average delay for RBS 
increases rapidly, for RBS with substitutions at a lesser rate, and for PBPRA at an 
even smaller rate. The weighted average delay for PBPRA is consistently lower than 
the other two schemes. 
 
Figure 3.2 Weighted average delay in minutes/flight for RBS, RBS with Substitutions 




For the second part of the analysis two different sets of airlines are considered. In the 
first set are included the airlines that are willing to pay more to get an extra early 
flight in the beginning of the allocation process and in this case is assigned Airline 6 
and Airline 8 from Table 3.2 to belong to this set. The other set consists of the rest of 
the flights that do not want to pay extra and have a chance of getting more later slots. 
Also for this analysis since the A-PBPRA mechanism is a randomized procedure, 
each scenario ran 100 times in a Monte Carlo simulation in Matlab and the average 
for each metric used is computed. 
 
Figure 3.3 Total weighted delay in minutes for RBS, RBS with substitutions and A-






Figure 3.4 Weighted average delay in minutes/flight for RBS, RBS with substitutions 
and A-PBPRA for each capacity scenario 
Figure 3.3 compares the total weighted delay accrued from all flights assigned to slots 
for the duration of the FCA, as determined by the Alternative PBPRA (A-PBPRA) 
mechanism, RBS, and RBS with substitutions. The total weighted delay for each 
capacity scenario with A-PBPRA is consistently lower than total weighted delay with 
RBS and RBS with substitutions. Figure 3.4 presents the weighted average delay for 
each flight that gets a slot. This is much lower for A-PBPRA compared to RBS and 
RBS with substitutions, especially for the cases for which the capacity is greatly 
reduced.  
Overall, both proposed allocation mechanisms – PBPRA and A-PBPRA – perform 
better than RBS and RBS with substitutions, with regard to ensuring that carriers’ 




weighted delay for both mechanisms is consistently much lower than RBS and lower 
than RBS with substitutions. Also, each flight with the proposed allocation 
mechanisms has to suffer less delay than RBS and RBS with substitutions, since it is 
assigned to the closest possible slot in order to minimize its delay. 
3.7 Estimating the Long Run Effect of Preference Based Proportional 
Random Allocation 
During an AFP the number of available slots is less than the number of flights 
scheduled to pass through the FCA, which means that these slots must be divided in a 
fair way among the carriers. So it is important to have an equitable resource allocation 
mechanism to do so. But even then, on a given day the slots allocated to an airline will 
not match exactly its fair share. Some days they will get more and some others less, so 
it is important to see if in the long run they will get on average what they want. If the 
difference of the fair share from the actual allocation is considered as an error, another 
goal of this research is to measure this error.  
Also another aspect of this problem is the variety in the sizes of carriers, or more 
precisely, the number of flights they have planned through the FCA.  This does not 
stem only from the size of the carrier itself, but also takes into account the fact that 
FCAs are geographically specific, and carriers have definite geographic patterns with 
which they operate, regardless of their size.  Nevertheless, in a given FCA, there will 
be “big” airlines, which will have many of their flights planned to pass through the 
affected area, and there will also be “smaller” ones with fewer flights. It would be 




different categories of carriers. For example, there might be cases where an airline has 
one flight scheduled to pass through the FCA. This means that its share in the 
available slots will be less than one, which means the resulting slot allocation might 
omit this carrier altogether. It might be “fair” to do this on some fraction of days, but 
certainly not on every day, if the underlying pattern were to be repeated.  So equity 
between carriers is a major concern, and perhaps more so for those who would expect 
to have a small presence in the schedule affected by a given FCA.  
As mentioned before, one of the goals of this research is to examine if this way of 
expressing priorities is valid. It was desired to see if at the end most of the higher 
priority flights have been assigned to slots. Also another goal was to check if the 
delays occurred by the highest priority flights are less than the rest. It is requisite 
airlines to give truthful preferences for which they will be more willing to do if they 
actually see that it makes sense delays-wise for some of their flight to have higher 
priority. If airlines give a 4 in all their flights on purpose to game the system, and since 
they will not be able to assign all these flights to slots, they might miss the opportunity 
of actually a flight that is in reality more important than others to get a slot. 
The delays accrued by flights that were given the highest priority number 4 are 
penalized more. The delay of these flights are multiplied by 4. Respectively the delays 
occurred by flights given priority number 3 were multiplied by 3, those with priority 
number 2 multiplied by 2 and those with priority 1 stayed as were. In this analysis was 
estimated the average delay per flight per priority number. The flights that essentially 
were accounted for their delays, were the ones that actually got allocated to a slot. The 




reroute, cancel, or delay them more, were not included in the calculations. Another 
thing also examined is the average delay per flight per airline and in this calculations 
the delays were not weighted according to the priority number assigned to them. 
In this problem there are two levels of randomness that can be identified and 
examined. The first is due to the random selection of airlines in the allocation 
algorithm. Even when the number of flights and slots stay the same, each time the 
allocation scheme is implemented the selection of airlines can differ. The second level 
of randomness comes from the fact that each time an AFP is implemented the number 
of flights that each airline has will vary. For the purpose of this research and in order 
to be able to have multiple repetitions of the allocation mechanism with varying input 
data, simulation was used. Simulation is a very fast and reliable tool for analysis of 
this kind. 
The first thing measured from the simulation output was, for each airline, how much 
variance there was in the number of assigned slots. Since each airline does not get the 
exact same number of slots each time, it would be desirable for these numbers to be 
quite close. For example, if an airline gets on average 10 slots but one time gets 5 and 
the next time 15, is this something that will not be easily acceptable from the airline’s 
dispatchers. 
Also it was of interest to see how much on average the slots assigned to the airlines 
deviated from their initially calculated fair share. In order to measure the deviation of 




     
The fair share deviation indicator, as it was similarly used by Carr et al. (1998), 
shows how much the actual average share (number of slots allocated to each airline) 
deviates from the fair share estimated before the allocation. If the numbers are zero 
then the actual share matches the fair share computed. The bigger this number 
becomes (positive) the actual share deviates and essentially the particular airline 
receives less slots than its fair share. If the number is negative the particular airline 
receives more slots than its fair share. What would be desirable is these numbers to be 
very close to zero. 
For the purposes of this research simulation was divided into two different parts, in 
order to isolate the variance that will appear in the outputs into two different sources. 
In the first part, was tested the effect that the random allocation procedure has by 
itself. In order to do that, a deterministic set of input data was used, so the only 
randomness in the simulation is in the proportional allocation procedure itself. In the 
second part, recognizing that there are stochastic fluctuations in demand input data due 
to various causes (e.g., schedule changes, seasonality, unexpected cancellations and 
delays due to crew issues and maintenance, etc.) randomness to the input data was 
added. 
3.7.1 Monte Carlo Simulation for Deterministic Set of Flights 
In the first set of simulations was considered a deterministic set of input data to our 
Monte Carlo simulation. Rather than work with a particular geographic scenario and 




with what tends to be observed in reality.  The exact same data set used in the previous 
analysis was used here also, and the mean number of flights per airline is shown in 
Table 3.2. Each simulation ran for 1000 replications and the results are presented in 
the following figures and tables.  
In Figure 3.5 can be seen the fair share for each airline, computed as described in 
section 3.4. After the allocation procedure ran, the average number of slots that each 
airline actually received was estimated, as can be seen in Figure 3.6. A first 
comparison of those two figures shows that, in the long run, airlines will be assigned 












Figure 3.5 Computed fair share for each airline and for each capacity reduction 
scenario 
 





The median number of slots for each airline is also presented in Figure 3.7, to have a 
better idea of how many slots airlines will usually get. Here it is clearer that smaller 
airlines have a good chance of getting slots. In Table 3.3 the coefficient of variation of 
slot allocation for each airline is presented. The coefficient tends to be smaller for 
bigger carriers. Probably this is caused by the fact that the resource allocation 
mechanism is specifically designed to be protective of small airlines’ slot claims. In 
general the coefficients for all airlines are very close, which is a good indication of the 
fairness of the allocation process. 
 






Table 3.3 Coefficient of Variation of Slots Allocated to Each Airline 
  Capacity Reduction to n ac/hr 
  25 20 15 
1 0.1962 0.2229 0.3227 
2 0.2457 0.4366 0.4893 
3 0.0799 0.1301 0.1473 
4 0.1330 0.1153 0.1903 
5 0.0493 0.0768 0.0982 
6 0.0392 0.0554 0.0350 
7 0.0955 0.1607 0.1366 


























9 0.1622 0.1848 0.1806 
 In Table 3.4 the results for the fair share deviation indicator can be seen. As 
explained before, the fair share deviation indicator shows how much the actual 
average share deviates from the fair share estimated before the allocation. As can be 
seen in this table, the indicator for each airline is quite close to zero, which means that 
in the long run airlines will receive numbers of slots that are very close to their fair 
share. 
In Table 3.5 the average delay per flight per airline occurred by flights that actually 
got assigned to a slot is presented. Can’t say a clear trend exists here. For some 
airlines as the number of slots available gets smaller, their average delay increases 




they get fewer flights, so fewer flights are included in the calculations. The second 
airline has the least flights and when the capacity is reduced to 15ac/h, many times it 
wouldn’t get a slot at all, which means the delay is accounted as zero. There isn’t any 
extremely big difference in the delays among the airlines. 
Table 3.4 Deviation of the Fair Share from the Actual Average Allocation 
  
Capacity Reduction to n 
ac/hr 
  25 20 15 
1 -0.0024 -0.0029 -0.0046 
2 0.0022 -0.0019 0.0036 
3 0.0035 0.0013 0.0012 
4 -0.0011 0.0007 -0.0034 
5 -0.0013 0.0055 -0.0028 
6 -0.0017 -0.0008 -0.0012 
7 0.0007 -0.0025 0.0023 











































Table 3.5 Average Delay (in Minutes) per Flight per Airline 
  
Capacity Reduction to n 
ac/hr 
  25 20 15 
1 17.5 25.9 20.4 
2 9.9 9.9 3.5 
3 6.1 15.5 22.4 
4 10.3 22.6 17.1 
5 4.0 13.1 17.8 
6 7.9 10.4 14.3 
7 11.5 18.2 17.9 























9 18.0 12.9 14.2 
Finally in Table 3.6 the results of the weighted average delay per priority number are 
presented. Although the delays of flights with priority given equal to 4 were weighted 
more, the average delay per flight is consistently less than the average delay of flights 
with priority 3. From the simulation was observed that most of the flights assigned to 
slots were of priority 4 and 3 and consequently most of the flights left unassigned had 
a priority of 2 and 1. This explains the fact that the delays for flights with priority 2 
and 1 are less than the ones with higher priorities. It is not that they were assigned to 
slots that were closer to the initial scheduled times, but they weren’t assigned to any 
slot at all. The fact that many flights with priorities 2 and 1 are excluded by the 





Table 3.6 Weighted Average Delay (in Minutes) per Flight per Priority Number 
  Capacity Reduction to n ac/hr 
  25 20 15 
4 16.4 35.3 67.2 
3 22.4 47.6 76.6 







1 15.5 20.4 12.1 
 
3.7.2 Monte Carlo Simulation for Random Set of Flights 
For the next part of the simulation, variability to the input data (the number of flights 
for each airline) was added. In reality, the schedule of airlines fluctuates, and since it 
was a goal to comply with that, the traffic at Boston Logan for every Monday of two 
consecutive months was observed – February and March of 2011. For the same 
airlines as mentioned before, the number of flights was observed and incorporated 
similar levels of variation into the simulation. The mean number of flights matches the 
number of flights used in the previous set of experiments, but now the number of 
flights for each airline for each run varies following a uniform distribution whose 




In Figure 3.8 is present the average fair share computed for each airline. Since the 
number of flights for each airline fluctuated from run to run, a new fair share was 
calculated in each run and in this table we have the average fair share from these runs.  
 






Figure 3.9 Average number of slots for each airline 
In figures 3.9 and 3.10, are present the average and median number of slots that each 
airline actually got after the resource allocation mechanism was implemented. Again 
here it can be seen that the number of slots allocated to each airline matches very well 





Figure 3.10 Median number of slots for each airline 
In Table 3.7 can be seen the coefficient of variation of slots allocated to each airline. 
The coefficient for airlines with larger numbers of flights tends to be smaller than for 
those with fewer flights. This is partly because the bigger airlines have greater 
fluctuation in their schedules on a day-to-day basis. Overall the coefficients for all 
airlines are similar. Also the coefficients compared to the results with deterministic 
flights are a bit larger. This is expected, and the difference represents the marginal 
contribution of the noise in the schedule to the observed variation.  The added effect of 
variability on number of flights has contributed to that. This can be better observed in 







Table 3.7 Coefficient of Variation of Slots Allocated to Each Airline 
  
Capacity Reduction to n 
ac/hr 
  25 20 15 
1 0.2336 0.2878 0.2743 
2 0.3007 0.3710 0.4073 
3 0.1405 0.1539 0.1517 
4 0.1930 0.2205 0.2353 
5 0.1313 0.1400 0.1440 
6 0.0853 0.0933 0.0914 
7 0.1600 0.1886 0.1922 

































Figure 3.11 Variance of slots when capacity is reduced to 25 ac/hr 
 





Figure 3.13 Variance of slots when capacity is reduced to 15 ac/hr 
In Figures 3.11-3.13 can be seen that the airlines 5 and 6 have greater difference in 
their variances for each scenario, between the deterministic and the stochastic cases. 
This is due to the fact that they are bigger carriers and the range of flights they have is 
greater than the other airlines. For example airline 6 has on average 16 flights but it 
was observed that there were days that had 14 flights and other days up to 17. The 
airline 2, which represents the smaller carrier with only 2 flights, has small variance 
and the difference of it between the deterministic and stochastic cases is also small, 
because it was observed that the number of flights it has doesn’t fluctuate with time. 
In Table 3.8 are presented the results for the fair share deviation indicator. Here also, 
the indicator for each airline is very close to zero, which means that the airlines on 




Table 3.8 Deviation of the Average Fair Share from the Actual Average Allocation 
  Capacity Reduction to n ac/hr 
  25 20 15 
1 -0.00093 -0.00008 -0.00181 
2 -0.00043 -0.00173 0.00245 
3 0.00009 0.00074 0.00152 
4 -0.00007 0.00009 -0.00116 
5 -0.00024 0.00018 -0.00111 
6 0.00043 0.00085 -0.00041 
7 0.00077 -0.00011 -0.00136 













































Table 3.9 Average Delay (in Minutes) per Flight per Airline 
  
Capacity Reduction to n 
ac/hr 
  25 20 15 
1 12.2 17.1 21.2 
2 13.0 19.9 3.8 
3 10.0 15.6 19.9 
4 10.8 17.4 21.2 
5 8.2 13.3 18.9 
6 6.5 11.4 16.1 
7 10.6 16.1 20.9 


































Table 3.10 Weighted Average Delay (in Minutes) per Flight per Priority Number 
 
 
Capacity Reduction to n 
ac/hr 
  25 20 15 
4 23.2 36.8 48.1 
3 24.8 44.0 64.4 







1 11.6 17.1 18.0 
 
Finally at tables 3.9 and 3.10 are presented the average delays per flight per airline and 
per priority number assigned respectively. In the first of these two tables, it is clear 
that when capacity reduces the amount of delay accrued by each airline increases. 
With the exception of airline 2, which has the least slots and when capacity reduces 
much it doesn’t often being assigned to any slot, the differences in delays among the 
airlines are reasonable. In the other table can be seen again the same trend as before. 
The weighted average delay for flights with priority 4 is consistently less than the 
delay of flights with priority 3. As the number of priority reduces it was observed that 
the number of flights left without being assigned increased, which caused the reduced 





In this research was proposed a meaningful way for carriers to express some 
preference structure during AFP. Also two resource allocation mechanisms were 
proposed that will improve the system efficiency and at the same time will take into 
account the preferences of the airlines. First, was examined how the results from 
using the proposed preference structure of airlines in the first proposed allocation 
scheme –PBPRA- is compared to RBS and RBS with substitutions. The results 
showed that the total weighted delay and weighted average delay for PBPRA is 
consistently lower than RBS and RBS with substitutions. Then was examined how 
the second allocation mechanism proposed, A-PBPRA, works compared to RBS and 
RBS with substitutions. The results showed that the total weighted and weighted 
average delay accrued by the flights with the proposed mechanism – A-PBPRA- is 
also much lower than the ones with RBS and RBS with substitutions. This work can 
be extended to look at other allocation mechanisms that can for example consider 
some airlines getting a number of early flights (more than one) for a higher price and 
then the rest of their share of flights to be of lesser value. Also the airlines preference 
structure can be extended to have some additional components, apart from the priority 
number and the maximum delay allowed, to make it even more rich and at the same 
time not containing much proprietary information.  
During AFPs the airlines in the long-run will be getting on average what they want. 
As was estimated the smaller carriers have good chances of actually getting slots in 
the constraint areas. For smaller airlines the variance of slots allocated tends to be 
smaller than the variances for the bigger carriers. It was also shown that for the flights 




priorities 2 and 1 were not. The weighted delays for the flights with priority 4 were 




Chapter 4: Impact of Improved Predictability 
As mentioned in the beginning of this dissertation, airlines will benefit from increased 
flight predictability. Airlines tend to add extra time to their scheduled block times in 
order to absorb delays and maintain their schedules intact as much as possible. It is a 
way to deal with unexpected delays that occur frequently and cause many problems to 
the airlines due to missed connections, crews being overtime, unhappy passengers etc. 
The anticipated mechanisms by which benefits could be realized as a result of 
improvements in strategic flight predictability can be articulated as follows: 
• A reduction in the variability of actual flight times should lead to a reduction 
in scheduled block times and fuel buffers. 
• The reduction in scheduled block times should lead to shorter actual block 
times. 
• The reduction in fuel buffer will lead to a reduction in contingency fuel 
loaded, which will also lead to a reduction in actual fuel usage. 
• With improvements in scheduled and actual block times, carriers could 
hypothetically achieve the same levels of scheduled operations with fewer aircraft 
and less total crew duty time. 
While the number and duration of operations is not expected to change under this 
hypothesis, the fuel burned on every segment of each itinerary would be reduced. 
4.1 Analyzing Scheduled Block Times 
Since scheduled block time is the key component of the benefits analysis and in order 




specific flights were analyzed. Before any analysis, it is important to clarify the 
definitions of some of the phases of flight. A graphical display of them is presented in 
the following Figure 4.1. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Definitions of phases of flight 
The actual block time is the time between the actual departure and actual arrival time. 
As the effective flight time is considered the time elapsed between the scheduled 
departure time and the actual arrival time. In other words it includes the actual block 
time and the departure delay. Some portion of the departure delay is caused by the 
late arrival of the aircraft from its previous leg (late aircraft delay) and since this 
delay is already counted in the previous leg, the idea is to remove this portion from 
the current flight. So the truncated effective flight time can be considered, which is 




4.1.1 Scheduled Block Time for a Single Flight 
First data for a single flight from January 2009 to December 2011 was collected (BTS 
2013) and broken it down by quarter. Weekdays only were taken into account. The 
flight chosen was a United Airlines from Boston to San Francisco that leaves around 
6am. In the data the scheduled time of departure was ranging is between 6.00am to 
6.20am. The flight number for this was UA171 until October 2010 and changed to 









From the figures 4.2 and 4.3, it is evident that airlines do not have a fixed schedule 
block time for each flight within the same quarter. As it can be seen in Figure 4.2, the 
scheduled block times oscillate quarterly and during the 1st and 4th quarter these times 
are higher. In Figure 4.3 can be seen that during some quarters, especially the 4th 
there is increased standard deviation.  
 
Figure 4.3 Standard deviation of the scheduled block time for a single flight between 
BOS-SFO 
4.1.2 Scheduled Block Time for Multiple Flights in a Day 
The next step in the data analysis was to examine the effect of different departure 
times to the scheduled block times for the same Origin-Destination (O-D) pair for the 
same airline. For this part, other flights scheduled between BOS and SFO from 
United Airlines were included in the analysis. Again flights from January 2009 to 




flights were grouped to 5 different sets of departure times from BOS (6AM, 8AM, 
11AM, 3PM, 6PM, local times), because the departure times were changing a bit 
throughout the years. In the following figures, Figures 4.4-4.6, the results are 
presented.  
 






Figure 4.5 Median scheduled block times for all United Airlines flights between 
BOS-SFO 
As it can be seen in figures 4.4 and 4.5, flights with different departure times in the 
day for the same O-D pair have different scheduled block times. The difference in 
scheduled block times can exceed 20 minutes, for example the flight departing at 
3PM and flight departing at 6PM the 4th quarter in 2009. Finally the scheduled block 
times oscillate similarly by quarter and during the 1st and 4th quarter these times 





Figure 4.6 Standard deviations of the scheduled block times for all United Airlines 
flights between BOS-SFO 
4.1.3 Estimating Distributions 
It is known that airlines look at historical data, up to 5 years, for each Origin-
Destination (OD) pair and look at the distribution of the effective flight times. It is 
also common for them to use historical data of competitor airlines for the same OD 
pair.  From these distributions they set an on-time performance goal, which is flight 
specific and it may vary from 60% to 75%.  Some airlines might ignore the Late 
Aircraft Delay (LAD), which is defined as the portion of the departure delay 
attributed to the aircraft arriving late from its previous flight leg, and construct the 
distributions of the truncated effective flight time (Deshpande and Arikan 2012). In 





In Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8 are presented the distribution of the effective flight time 
and the truncated effective flight time respectively for the third quarter of the years 
2009 and 2010. It appears that both distributions are skewed to the right and possible 
distributions that could fit this shape are the log-normal, log-Laplace, gamma. 
 






Figure 4.8 Distribution of the truncated effective flight time of flight with departure 
time 3PM 
 






Figure 4.10 Cumulative distribution of the truncated effective flight time of flight 
with departure time 3PM 
In Figure 4.9 and 4.10 are presented the cumulative distribution of the effective flight 
time and truncated effective flight time respectively. As mentioned above, it is 
believed that airlines look at the distributions of the past few years and try to set a 
goal for the next year, to reach a certain level of service. While looking at the average 
scheduled block time set for the third quarter of 2011, which was 385.1 minutes, and 
at Figure 4.10 it can be deduced that United had set it’s goal to be approximately 60% 
of flights to be on time. The actual percent of flights that arrived with delay less than 
15 minutes in 2011 was 74%. For the rest quarters of 2011, by looking at the actual 
average scheduled block times set for each of them, and looking at the distributions 
constructed from 2009-2010 data, can be concluded that United had set it’s goal to be 




In Figure 4.11 the distribution of the actual block time can be seen, which appears to 
be slightly skewed to the right. 
 
Figure 4.11 Distribution of the actual block time of flight with departure time 3PM 
 





Figure 4.13 Distribution of the truncated departure delay of flight with departure time 
3PM 
Finally in figures 4.12 and 4.13 are presented the distribution of the departure delay 
and truncated departure delay respectively. Possible distributions that could fit their 
shape is the exponential and gamma. 
4.1.4 Fitting Gamma Distribution to Data 
The next step presented in this section is to fit the actual data to a distribution. The 
distribution chosen is gamma, because of its flexible shape, depending on the 
parameters chosen – shape and scale -.  First the gamma distribution was fitted to the 
effective flight times for the 3rd quarter of 2009 and 2010. In Figure 4.14 is depicted 




To have 385.1 average scheduled block time for the 3rd quarter in 2011, the percent 
given from the gamma distribution is 54.9%. In other words the airline must had 
chosen 54.9% of their flights to be on time.  
 





Figure 4.15 Fitting gamma distribution to the actual data of truncated effective flight 
time 
Then the gamma distribution was fitted to the truncated effective flight times for the 
3rd quarter of 2009 and 2010. The shape parameter is 413.889 and scale parameter is 
0.919 for this gamma distribution, which is depicted in Figure 4.15. To have 385.1 
average scheduled block time for 3rd quarter in 2011 the percent given by this 
distribution is 60.6%. If the findings from the two fittings are compared with what we 
get from the cumulative distribution functions, which is approximately 60% of flights 
to be considered on time, can be concluded that the fitting of the truncated effective 





4.2 Estimating Scheduled Block Times 
4.2.1 Source of Information 
In order to solidify how airlines set their scheduled block times, input from industry 
experts was asked for. Individual meetings and phone interviews with the following 
people were held: 
-­‐ Meeting with the Delta team responsible for the estimation of SBT 
-­‐ Teleconference with Jim Hamilton, from UPS 
-­‐ Teleconference with George Kypreos from American Airlines 
-­‐ Teleconference with Michael Clarke from Sabre and Tuell Green from 
American Airlines 
4.2.2 General Process 
From the discussions came out that all airlines follow the same general approach in 
order to estimate the SBT. They all break the block time in 3 components: taxi-in, 
airtime, taxi-out, as we can see in Figure 3.16. They look at historical data for each 
component and plot the distribution of block time. From this distribution they set an 
on-time performance goal, which is flight specific.  As it can be seen in Figure 3.17, 
for the distribution of historical block times an airline sets its goal to α%, which 





Figure 3.16 Block time breakdown  
 
Figure 3.17 Block time distribution and on-time performance goal set to α% 
The above three time components depend on the Origin-Destination (O-D) pair, the 
aircraft used, the time of the day, day of week and season. 
The airtime depends on what aircraft is used for the specific route. Airlines tend to 
estimate their en-route times by considering aircraft flying at their optimal speed. So 
for the same O-D pair, if various aircraft types are used, then for each of them a 




traffic issues in certain areas, like the Northeast where there are many metroplexes, 
which cause a greater variance in the flight times. Finally airtimes depend on the 
season since different wind patterns exist. 
Taxi times depend on the origin and destination airports. For each airport a different 
taxi-in and taxi-out time is calculated in order to take into account the specific 
characteristics of the airport (like runway usage, traffic, runway configuration etc). 
Taxi times also depend on the time of the day (peak and non-peak traffic) and the day 
of the week.   
All airlines exclude the outliers from their data and also constantly monitor the on-
time performance of flights and tweak the schedule as needed. Also, they do not take 
into account directly the propagated delay. 
4.2.3 Airlines’ Differentiations 
The general process is common for each airline. Of course depending on the airline 
and its business needs and models some parameters differentiate. The ones that vary 
are summarized as follows. 
Percentiles 
The range of percentiles that each carrier considers varies. UPS for example, a freight 
carrier, gives a great emphasis on the on-time arrival of parcels in critical markets, 
especially for the early morning deliveries. So for these kinds of markets they look at 
the 80th to 90th percentile instead of the 60th percentile that they usually do. The range 
of percentiles for Delta Airlines is 65%-75% and for American Airlines 70%-75%. 




Different approaches are used to estimate the taxi-out and taxi-in times. One airline 
takes the average taxi-in and taxi-out times observed. Another airline takes the 
average taxi-in and taxi-out times observed the few previous months. In the case of 
contingencies such as runway construction they use surface simulations to estimate 
the new taxi times. In another airline, they estimate the taxi-out times with the 
assistance of a simulation software after they input all the parameters i.e. other airline 
traffic, runway usage during different time periods, taxiway traffic, separation, 
runway configuration etc. For the taxi-in times they usually set to 5-8 minutes, unless 
there is a big issue with terminal location versus runway usage. 
Data used 
The data that each airline uses for their analysis is also different. One of the airlines 
looks at historical data for each O-D pair since 1988. Another airline looks at the last 
3-4 last years if nothing has changed. The third airline for the airtime looks at the last 
5 years and for the taxi times only the most recent – few months-.  
Seasons considered 
Two of the airlines consider only two seasons (Summer-Winter). At the other airline 
they consider eight seasons for the domestic flights and two seasons for their 
international flights. 
Types of days 
For this parameter there is a great variation among the airlines. One airline considers 
all days together. Another airline considers each day separately. And for the third 





4.3 Estimating the Strategic Benefits of Increased Flight Predictability 
The scope of this work is to estimate the benefits for airlines due to the improvement 
in strategic flight predictability. The work flow for the benefits assessment related to 
scheduled block time begins with the work conducted by U.C. Berkeley, which 
developed airline specific scenarios for the impact of changes in empirical block time 
distributions on scheduled and actual block times.  These scenarios were used as the 
entry points for an economic benefits assessment. In all scenarios the median block 
time remains the same. Scenario1 depicts a condition where flight time variability is 
reduced due to the increase of the shortest flight times. The second scenario depicts 
the exact opposite case, where the longest block times are reduced the most. Finally 
Scenario 3 considers a consistent change throughout the flight time distribution. 
The benefits assessment process will use the results shown in Table 4.1, for Low Cost 
Carriers (LCC) and legacy carriers, Delta Airlines, American Airlines, and United 
Airlines.  
Table 4.1 Evaluation results under different scenarios 
 LCC Delta Airlines American Airlines United Airlines 





0.96 -3.27 -1.16 1.19 -3.44 -1.12 1.23 -3.58 -1.17 1.31 -3.35 -1.02 
SBT 




These changes in mean actual and scheduled block time can be related to changes in 
average daily flights per aircraft and average pilot salary per available seat mile 
(ASM) using regression coefficients from a study by Moreno-Hines and Kirkman 
(2013). In their analysis was included the estimation of coefficients that can be 
directly applied to the task of converting between average scheduled block time and 
certain dependent variables that, by themselves, are not monetized, but that can be 
monetized in a subsequent step using some reasonable assumptions. Table 4.2 below 
shows the coefficients used in this benefits assessment, as taken from that reference. 



































6.4Ε-5       8.2Ε-5 6.7Ε-5     
There are two limitations of that study that add some complication to the prospect of 
using the results in this benefits analysis. First, the empty cells in Table 4.2 represent 
coefficients that would be necessary for completeness, but were not included in the 
paper. In the paper, each model was developed in a parsimonious form, so 
independent variables that did not significantly improve the fit of the model were 




what the un-estimated coefficients might have been, or what their p-values might 
have been. 
Secondly, the set of carriers reported in that study does not match exactly the set used 
for the scenario generation as part of the scheduled block time impact modeling 
performed for this work.  As a result, a mapping between the two sets was 
constructed, which then necessitates the assumption that the effects to certain carriers 
are expected to be the same as those of other “similar” carriers.  In particular, both 
studies used the major carriers American, Delta, and United, so those results were 
directly transferable. The Moreno-Hines and Kirkman study included Northwest 
Airlines, which was absorbed into Delta Airlines in 2010. In this study, the results for 
Northwest are ignored, although one could argue that their expected behavior might 
in some way manifest itself as part of Delta, but there is no way of quantifying this. 
Among low-cost carriers, the Moreno-Hines and Kirkman paper included American 
Eagle, JetBlue, and Southwest. In the current study, low-cost carriers were 
consolidated into one entity with respect to scenario generation.  
Table 4.3 below shows the data used for the benefits assessment.  The Available Seat 
Miles (ASM), numbers of pilots/copilots, fleet size, and departures per year are from 
BTS.  The wage data is also from BTS, specifically US DOT Form 41, Schedule P6 
& P10.  The yearly ownership cost per aircraft is computed as a weighted average.  
For each carrier, their fleet is stratified into different airframe types, each with 
different ownership costs.  The average ownership cost per aircraft is then a weighted 
average of these values, weighted by the fraction of the total fleet represented by that 




The three following tables 4.4-4.6 show the results of the analysis, one for each of the 
scenarios.  In Scenario 1, American and Delta can save over 1.5 aircraft apiece, 
resulting in significant savings in ownership costs.  The savings to United are more 
modest.  As mentioned above, the necessary data to compute these savings for the 
low cost carriers are missing.  For all of the carriers, however, it was possible to 
compute expected savings in pilot and flight attendant salaries that would be realized 
by conducting the same operational tempo with fewer total aircraft.  Again, the 
numbers for American and Delta are high, and for United quite low.  The savings for 


















Table 4.3 Data for benefits assessment 











9.00E+10 1.09E+11 6.27E+10 2.34E+10 3.09E+10 1.03E+11 
Pilots/Co-
pilots (2011) 















$51,197 $40,475 $37,888 $32,088 $37,987 $54,120 
Fleet 
Count 

















Table 4.4 Results for benefit Scenario 1 
    Low Cost Carriers (LCC) 




Airlines Airtran JetBlue Southwest 
% of Saved 
Aircraft 1.61 1.56 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Savings from 
Aircraft Saved  
 
$17,326,246   $19,717,863  
 
$4,998,482   $-     $-     $-    














 $4,066,454   $4,055,643   $229,985   $715,063   $1,024,682   $3,350,200  
 
Scenario 2 exhibited the most pronounced reduction in scheduled block times, and 
hence should produce the greatest expected savings.  The results in Table 4.5 below 
can verify this. The relative standings amongst the airlines are the same as before, 
which is to be expected, because the cost coefficients are the same. Finally, Table 4.6 
below shows the results for Scenario 3, which was representative of an intermediate 










Table 4.5 Results for benefit Scenario 2 







Airlines Airtran JetBlue Southwest 
% of Saved 
Aircraft 3.77 2.81 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Savings from 
Aircraft Saved   $40,487,757   $35,419,125   $7,103,105   $-     $-     $-    
Reduction in 
Pilot salaries for 
current scenario 
(salary savings) 









 $9,502,440   $7,285,136   $326,821   $1,190,461  
 
$1,705,927   $5,577,530  
 
Table 4.6 Results for benefit Scenario 3 







Airlines Airtran JetBlue Southwest 
% of Saved 
Aircraft 2.69 2.18 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Savings from 






$6,050,794   $-     $-     $-    
Reduction in 






$21,028,284   $923,577  
 











4.3.1 Estimating the Benefits for the NAS 
 An extension of this work is to estimate what would be the benefits across the 
National Airspace System (NAS). In order to do so, it was need to include a few more 
carriers in this analysis. From Figure 3.18 can be seen which carriers have the biggest 
domestic market share. Most of the top airlines have been included already in the 
analysis, but two major carriers are missing and these are US Airways and Alaska 
Airlines. Since the coefficients are not known for these airlines, some assumption 
need to be made, that these carriers are similar with some of the carriers used 
previously and have the necessary data and assume that the benefits will be similar. 
For US Airways and Alaska Airlines is assumed that they have the same coefficients 
as American Airlines. From Figure 3.18 can be seen that their share is closer to 
American Airline’s than the other two major carriers, Delta and United. 
 In the figure is also depicted that two regional carriers are included ExpressJet and 
Skywest. Unfortunately in the initial analysis there was no regional carrier included, 
so there are no data available to work with. However, since some Low Cost Carriers 
are included, this work could be extended by considering an additional one. Frontier 
is also a LCC and the assumption has to be made is that it will get similar benefits as 
Airtran, so this input can be used. Another type of carriers that are not included in this 
work is freight carriers. Freight carriers operate under different business model than 
major carriers, so their benefits cannot be directly associated. Also, most of their 
critical operations take place overnight where traffic levels are low and queuing 
delays are present. This means that the need to add contingency to their scheduled 




predictability will not be as profound. Additionally freight carriers do not report to 
BTS and that would make very difficult to find the necessary input data.  
 
Figure 3.18 Airline Domestic Market Share (source: BTS) 
The following Table 4.7 shows the data we used for this analysis. The sources of the 










Table 4.7 Additional data for benefit assessment 
 
US Airways Alaska Airlines Frontier 
Available Seat 
Miles (2011) 5.25E+10 2.38E+10 1.11E+10 
Pilots/Co-pilots 
(2011) 4003 1286 676 
Departures per 
year (2011) 403000 145000 85000 
Mean Annual 
Wage for Pilots 
(2011) 
$109,535 $155,024 $113,250 
Mean Annual 
Wage for Flight 
Attendants (2011) 
$40,442 $35,433 $19,105 




$2,469,821 $2,138,191 $2,496,360 
 
In the following tables 4.8-4.10 are presented the results for each of the scenarios 
used in the previous analysis. Again, the scenario that shows the most cost savings is 













Table 4.8 Additional results for Scenario 1 
 US Airways Alaska Airlines Frontier 
% of Saved 
Aircraft 1.14 1.27 0.00 
Savings from 
Aircraft Saved  $9,232,857 $3,565,342  $-    









 $2,393,193   $672,042   $228,112  
 
Table 4.9 Additional results for Scenario 2 
 
US Airways Alaska Airlines Frontier 
% of Saved 
Aircraft 2.67 2.97 0 
Savings from 
Aircraft Saved  $21,575,227 $8,331,446  $-    

















Table 4.10 Additional results for Scenario 3 
 
US Airways Alaska Airlines Frontier 
% of Saved 
Aircraft 1.91 2.12 0 
Savings from 
Aircraft Saved   $15,404,042   $5,948,394   $-  









 $3,992,788   $1,121,230   $298,300  
 
In order to find the overall benefits across the NAS we add the benefits of each airline 
for each scenario, and the results are shown in Table 4.11 
Table 4.11 Total benefits  
 Total Savings from Aircraft Saved 





Scenario 1  $54,840,791   $56,899,702   $16,735,373  
Scenario 2  $112,916,660   $110,321,068   $33,130,886  
Scenario 3  $83,878,725   $83,102,092   $24,801,639  
The benefits for Scenario 2 will be the greatest, since for this scenario the reduction in 
scheduled block time was the highest. In general the savings from the pilot salary 
reduction will be approximately equal with the savings from aircraft saved. The 
savings from the flight attendant salary reduction will be approximately a third of the 




Once the system gets more predictable, the actual block times will be reduced. When 
this reduction will be profound enough will lead airlines to reduce their scheduled 





Chapter 5: Conclusion 
The air transportation system in the United States is one of the most complex systems 
in the world. Projections of increasing air traffic demand in conjunction with limited 
capacity, that is volatile and affected by exogenous random events, represent a major 
problem in aviation system management. Air traffic delays are always present and the 
more air traffic increases the more the delays will increase with serious economic 
impacts. The scope of this dissertation was to look closer at a threefold approach to 
the problem of congestion in aviation.  
The first part of this thesis was related to the prediction of delays and the 
development of a model that will make these predictions under a wide variety of 
distributional assumptions. In this work the mathematical construction of a continuum 
approximation to a queuing system was presented, that might represent a single 
congested resource in the National Airspace System, such as an airport, a runway, or 
some en route resource. This was the first time ever to consider diffusion 
approximation in the aviation setting. While the model formulation was based on past 
work done in other areas like biology, the numeric solution scheme – Finite Element 
Method (FEM) - was part of this work. A discrete approximation to the queue length 
density function was constructed by using triangular basis functions, instead of 
Gauss-Legendre quadrature, that have known integrals and can be easily solved. The 
Monte Carlo simulation was set up to serve as the ground truth to compare with the 
results from the diffusion approximation. It was achieved the replication of the known 
steady-state results from that small set of queuing systems for which equilibrium 




approximation gives exactly the same results very quickly. Furthermore, a Monte 
Carlo exercise was also conducted for a number of other cases whose solutions 
cannot be found analytically. Again, the diffusion model seemed to perform very 
well, and it is much faster than running large numbers of Monte Carlo simulations. 
This is one of the advantages of using this model. While the simulation running time 
increased significantly with the number of iterations, about 310 seconds for 100,000, 
the diffusion model was giving results in less than 10 seconds.  
In the second part of this work a parsimonious language of exchange was designed, 
with accompanying allocation mechanisms that allow carriers and the FAA to work 
together quickly, in a CDM environment, to allocate scarce capacity resources. A 
simple mechanism was proposed that requires each airline to give to each of their 
flights a priority number ranging from 1 to 4. The greater the number assigned to a 
flight the more important this flight is. It is also required that for each flight, carriers 
specify the maximum delay in minutes that they would allow it to be assigned on the 
ground. An extension of this was also proposed, where airlines can give an additional 
input regarding their preferences. Airlines can declare their intent to be considered as 
one of two different kinds of airlines: those that would prefer getting earlier slots (at a 
cost of depleting their fair share faster), and those that would prefer getting a larger 
number of slots overall, with the understanding that some of those will likely have 
large delays associated with them. While the allocation mechanism - Preference 
Based Proportional Random Allocation (PBPRA) - used in the first part of the work 
was proposed in past work, in this work it was modified accordingly in order to use 




scheme was proposed, which was called Alternative Preference Based Proportional 
Random Allocation (A-PBPRA). This modified scheme can be related by imagining 
that in the first scheme, the “price” of each slot is one point of fair share, while in this 
second or modified scheme we allow that “price” to be higher for carriers that prefer 
to be allocated a smaller number of premium slots.  
The results showed that the total weighted delay and weighted average delay for 
PBPRA is consistently lower than RBS and RBS with substitutions. Then it was 
examined how the second allocation mechanism proposed, A-PBPRA, works 
compared to RBS and RBS with substitutions. The results showed that the total 
weighted and weighted average delay accrued by the flights with the proposed 
mechanism – A-PBPRA- is also much lower than the ones with RBS and RBS with 
substitutions. 
On a given day the slots allocated to an airline will not match exactly its fair share. 
Some days they will get more and some others less, so it is important to see if in the 
long run they will get on average what they want. As mentioned before, one of the 
goals of this research is to examine if this way of expressing priorities is valid. It was 
interesting to check if the delays occurred by the highest priority flights are less than 
the rest. In this problem there are two levels of randomness that were identified and 
were examined. The first is due to the random selection of airlines in the allocation 
algorithm. Even when the number of flights and slots stay the same, each time the 
allocation scheme is implemented the selection of airlines can differ. The second 
level of randomness comes from the fact that each time an AFP is implemented the 




in order to be able to have multiple repetitions of the allocation mechanism (PBPRA) 
with varying input data, simulation was used.  
During AFPs the airlines in the long-run will be getting on average what they want. 
As it was observed the smaller carriers have good chances of actually getting slots in 
the constraint areas. For smaller airlines the variance of slots allocated tends to be 
smaller than the variances for the bigger carriers. It was also shown that for the flights 
with priorities 4 and 3 were most of them assigned to slots and most of the ones with 
priorities 2 and 1 were not. The weighted delays for the flights with priority 4 were 
less than the ones with priority 3. 
In the final part of this work the monetary benefits of improvements in strategic flight 
predictability as manifested through carriers’ scheduled block times were assessed. 
Airlines tend to add extra time to their scheduled block times in order to absorb 
delays and maintain their schedules intact as much as possible. It is a way to deal with 
unexpected delays that occur frequently and cause many problems to the airlines due 
to missed connections, crews being overtime, unhappy passengers etc. Once the 
variability of the actual block times reduces, the scheduled block times will reduce 
and airlines will be able to achieve the same levels of scheduled operations with 
fewer aircraft and less total crew duty time. 
This work contributed in establishing the process that airlines follow to set their 
scheduled block times, since scheduled block time is the key component of the 
benefits analysis. Then the benefits of reduced SBT for some major carriers and Low 
Cost Carriers were estimated. Finally the number of carriers included in the analysis 




the savings from aircraft saved and reduced pilot salaries can be very significant and 
reaching more than 100 million dollars per year for each of them. Also much savings 
can be achieved due to reduced flight attendants salaries, and they will be 
approximately a third of the other two categories.  
All this work could be extended in various ways. For the first part, a single queue 
model was proposed, so one of the next steps would be to extend it for multiple 
queues. Then a network of queues would be appropriate to depict the NAS. Similar 
work has been done in the past for waterway delays, which share similar traits, such 
as two-way traffic between nodes, interdependence between arrivals etc. (Dai and 
Schonfeld, 1998). For the second part a single FCA was considered with a 
predetermined duration and fixed area. It would be interesting to develop an 
algorithm that would model the presence of 2 FCAs in certain proximity so there will 
be many flights that are scheduled to pass from both areas. Also another extension 
would be to study a moving FCA or an FCA that is terminated early or have to be 
extended further. This work did not examine what happens to the flights that are left 
without an assigned slot, so further research on this can be conducted. Finally in the 
last part of this work the benefits of improvement in strategic flight predictability 
were estimated. The work can be extended for benefits of improvement in operational 
flight predictability. Carriers will be able to better respond to scheduled disruptions 
on a particular day of operations and this will allow them to better re-accommodate 
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